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Abstract
Computer networks are getting more involved in providing services for most of our daily
life activities related to education, business, health care, social life, and government.
Publicly available computer networks are prone to targeted attacks and natural disasters
that could disrupt normal operation and services. Building highly resilient networks is an
important aspect of their design and implementation. For existing networks, resilience
against such challenges can be improved by adding more links. In fact, adding links to
form a full mesh yields the most resilient network but it incurs an unfeasibly high cost. In
this research, we investigate the resilience improvement of real-world networks via adding
a cost-efficient set of links. Adding a set of links to an obtain optimal solution using an
exhaustive search is impractical for large networks. Using a greedy algorithm, a feasible
solution is obtained by adding a set of links to improve network connectivity by increasing
a graph robustness metric such as algebraic connectivity or total graph diversity. We use
a graph metric called flow robustness as a measure for network resilience. To evaluate the
improved networks, we apply three centrality-based attacks and study their resilience.
The flow robustness results of the attacks show that the improved networks are more
resilient than the non-improved networks.
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5.46 GÉANT closeness attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.47 Resilience state space for Level 3 with degree attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.48 Resilience state space for Level 3 with closeness attack . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.49 Resilience state space for Level 3 with betweenness attack . . . . . . . . 131
5.50 Resilience state space for Internet2 with degree attack . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.51 Resilience state space for Internet2 with closeness attack . . . . . . . . . 132
5.52 Resilience state space for Internet2 with betweenness attack . . . . . . . 133
5.53 Resilience state space for CORONET with degree attack . . . . . . . . . 134
5.54 Resilience state space for CORONET with closeness attack . . . . . . . . 134
5.55 Resilience state space for CORONET with betweenness attack . . . . . . 135
xiii
Page left intentionally blank.
xiv
List of Tables
2.1 Flow robustness values in six graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Properties of baseline graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Physical graph properties of three service provider networks . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Weighted graph properties of five service provider networks . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 Population-based weighted example cities and their population . . . . . . 43
3.5 Physical graph properties of three service provider networks . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Correlation with real networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7 Calculating weighed flow robustness values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.8 Measuring SFRB of a 9-node wheel topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 a(G) and cost values for the example graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 EPD and cost values for the candidate links in the example graph . . . . 63
4.3 Centrality variance and cost for candidate links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.1 Graph metrics execution time in seconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2 Algebraic connectivity improvement evaluation via flow robustness . . . . 82
5.3 Sum of flow robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Baseline graphs robustness evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5 Random graphs robustness correlation values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6 Real-world networks robustness evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.7 Evaluating graph robustness metrics using baseline graphs . . . . . . . . 116
5.8 Evaluating graph robustness metrics using random graphs . . . . . . . . 117
5.9 Evaluating robustness improvements for unweighted graphs . . . . . . . . 126
5.10 Evaluating robustness improvements for population-based weighted graphs 127
5.11 Evaluating robustness improvements for real-world weighted graphs . . . 128
5.12 Resilience values via state model evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
xv
Page left intentionally blank.
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Computer networked applications play an increasingly vital role in supporting a wide
range of services. Health care providers and receivers are becoming more dependent
on computer networked applications [2]. E-learning is becoming an essential part of
academic and professional education [3], and on-line businesses have an increasing number
of customers. In 2014, the business-to-consumer (B2C) sales are estimated to be $1.5
trillion while this number is projected to increase in the upcoming years [4]. In addition,
most small networks rely on the Internet to communicate with each other. For example,
international companies can use the Internet to tunnel their communications among their
networks in different cities or countries. The Internet can be divided from a topological
point of view to several layers: physical layer, IP, router, PoP (point of presence), and
AS (autonomous system) level [5]. The fact that these network services are publicly
available makes them prone to targeted attacks. The availability of services depends on
the operational state of each level. Each level is susceptible to random failures due to
natural events or targeted attacks performed by adversaries.
Computer network resilience is defined as the ability of the network to provide and
maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of various faults and challenges to
normal operation [6–8]. Since computer networks are susceptible to targeted attacks and
1
natural disasters that could disrupt its normal operation and services, designing a network
with higher resilience can save both lives and money. Increasing the overall resilience of
a network can be achieved by the two main mechanisms redundancy and diversity, which
can be applied to several levels of computer networks [7]. In this research, we exploit
these two mechanisms while minimizing the cost to add links to physical level networks to
improve the overall network resilience. For example, links are added to maximize graph
robustness metrics such as algebraic connectivity or path diversity.
The physical topology consists of elements such as fiber and copper cables, point-to-point
wireless links, ADMs (add drop multiplexers), cross-connects, and layer-2 switches [9].
From a topological perspective, physical level networks are prone to two types of failures,
namely node and link failures. Node failure can be caused by a failure at the operating
components at the nodes such as ADMs and layer-2 switches. On the other hand, link
failures are mostly caused by fiber cuts, which could be intentional by an adversary or
unintentional human error. The node failure is considered to have a higher negative
impact than link failures since all links to the failed node also fail. The impact of failing
physical nodes or links is different from one network to another based on the graph
structure. In a poor physical network design, removing a few nodes or links can have a
catastrophic impact on the connectivity of other nodes, which in turn affects the service
state negatively. As a result, applications that rely on these network services fail to
deliver their services to end users such as banks and hospitals, which could cost money
and lives. To cope with this problem, we need to improve network resilience against
these node or links attacks. One approach is adding a small additional set of links to the
network, these same nodes or links removals can have insignificant effect over network
operation and services.
In an attempt to provide good network resilience measure, many researchers have pro-
posed graph metrics that assess network robustness against nodes or links removal. For
2
example, some classic graph metrics, such as average node degree, clustering coëficcient,
average hop count for shortest paths, radius, and diameter have been used to measure
connectivity and robustness. k-connectivity – which indicates the removal of a minimum
of k nodes to partition the graph – provides a good robustness measure against node
failures. On the other hand, min-cut – which specifies the minimum number of links
to partition a graph – provides a good robustness measure against link failures. These
two metrics are promising robustness measures; however, the algorithmic complexity for
these problems is NP-complete [10], which makes them intractable solutions for large
networks.
In this research, we compare the accuracy of several graph properties and graph robust-
ness metrics to predict network resilience against targeted attacks. Using a set of baseline
graphs, we calculate graph properties and robustness metrics for each graph to an in-
tuition for how each metric is determined. Then, we present three resilience metrics to
measure connectivity against centrality-based node attacks. These metrics calculate the
sum of flow robustness, which measures the number of remaining reliable flows during
each attack [11]. The sum of the flow robustness values, while attacking all nodes, is
our measure of network resilience. Using a large set of randomly generated graphs, we
check the accuracy of each graph robustness metric to predict graph resilience against
centrality-based attacks.
Adding a set of links or nodes to the graphs to optimally maximize a certain graph
property is known in the literature as graph augmentation and several problems are
proven to be NP-hard [12], even for one objective function such as optimally increasing
the algebraic connectivity [13]. Hence, adding objective functions, such as maximizing the
algebraic connectivity and minimizing the cost, could be more complex. This complexity
increases execution time, which makes these algorithms not practical for some network
services such as real-time applications.
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Several optimization problems have been approached using a greedy algorithm, which
gives a feasible solution to the problem by adding links with local optimality since global
optimality is infeasible for large size networks. In this research, we employ this type of
algorithm to improve the robustness of a graph by adding a set of links to improve a given
robustness graph metric while minimizing the total cost of adding physical links, which
could be the proportional to the length of added fiber cables. Using greedy algorithms,
we improve the connectivity of a given graph via adding a set of links to maximize a given
robustness metric function. We apply our algorithms to real-world networks to generate
a set of improved graphs based on presented robustness metrics. Then, we evaluate the
non- and improved graphs by applying the three centrality-based attacks to examine
their resilience against such attacks. Furthermore, by studying the evaluation results, we
show which improvement approach, i.e. maximizing which metric yields better resilient
networks.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The design of resilient physical-level networks requires understanding of graph robust-
ness metrics. Moreover, physical-level network resilience evaluation requires understat-
ing node and link vulnerability, which can be used to apply worst case scenario attacks.
Adding new links to maximize the robustness of a given network can have different out-
comes for different robustness metrics. Therefore, our thesis statement is:
Network connectivity improvement, via adding a new set of links to maxi-
mize a given graph robustness metric under cost constraints, can improve the
resilience of the underlying networks against targeted attacks. Determining
the best robustness metric can better improve the overall resilience.
4
The goal of this dissertation is fivefold:
1. Investigate graph robustness metrics and evaluate their accuracy to predict network
resilience against centrality attacks for both synthetic and real service provider
networks.
2. Introduce a model to generate physical-level graph based on an unweighted physical-
level graph nodes population.
3. Introduce greedy algorithms to improve a given graph using different graph robust-
ness metrics.
4. Evaluate the non- and improved graphs by applying targeted attacks.
5. Compare the results of applying the attacks in terms of their flow robustness and
identify the scenarios that yields the best results for each algorithm.
1.2 Proposed Solution
For a given communication network, our objective is to add a set of links so that the
network resilience is increased the most against targeted attacks. To fulfill this objec-
tive, we first investigate the robustness graph metrics presented in the literature, and
from which, we select the most promising metrics based on their accuracy to predicate
network resilience against such attacks. Then, we discuss the algorithmic complexity to
determine their values since this significantly impacts the algorithm time complexity for
large networks.
For each robustness metric, we propose a greedy algorithm that adds links to increase the
value for that metric and minimize the total cost, which is assumed to be relative to the
length of the added link. For each link added, we show the robustness improvement for
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each metric and the cost incurred by adding the link. Then, we apply these algorithms
on real-world networks by adding a set of links and generate the improved graphs.
To compare the proposed greedy algorithms, we evaluate the non- and improved graphs
by applying several attacks while measuring their flow robustness. In general, there are
two types of attack models, namely random and targeted. Random attacks result in nodes
or links are removed from a network based on a random distribution such as the uniform
distribution if nodes or links have equal failure likelihood. In targeted attacks, nodes
or links are targeted based on their importance. For example, nodes or links with high
centrality are attacked first by an intelligent adversary that aims to do the most damage.
In this research, we focus on targeted attacks because they cause more destruction to a
given network [14] and this is a critical aspect to Future Internet resilience. The flow
robustness metric basically measures the number of pair connections alive after the attack
and it is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.1.
By studying the behavior of the improved graphs against the attacks, we can conclude
what algorithm performs better in specific scenarios. A comprehensive study is given
to provide a cross comparison of applying the proposed algorithms on several real-world
networks and their robustness results against attacks. Our research provides an insight for
network designers to select what links to add to their networks based on the anticipated
attack types.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are:
1. Investigate graph robustness metrics and evaluate their accuracy in measuring net-
work resilience against centrality attacks for both synthetic and real service provider
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networks.
2. Define flow robustness graph metric for weighted graphs.
3. Model weighted physical-level graph based on nodes population.
4. Design a greedy algorithm to improve algebraic connectivity of a given graph by
adding a set of links while minimizing the overall cost for un- and weighted graphs.
5. Design a greedy algorithm to improve total graph diversity of a given graph by
adding a set of links while minimizing the overall cost.
6. Design a greedy algorithm to improve balance of the centrality of a given graph by
adding a set of links constrained by a given budget while minimizing the overall
cost for un- and weighted graphs.
7. Apply the improvement algorithms of real-world graphs and show the improved
graphs and their incurred cost.
8. Evaluate and compare the improvement algorithms by applying centrality-based
attacks on non- and improved real-world graphs to examine their resilience.
9. For each algorithm, identify the scenarios that yield the best results.
1.4 Relevant Publications
The research presented in this dissertation has resulted in a number of publications,
including the following.
7
Journal articles
10. Mohammed J.F. Alenazi, Egemen K. Çetinkaya, and James P.G. Sterbenz,
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“Network Design and Optimisation Based on Cost and Algebraic Connectivity,” in
Proceedings of the 5th IEEE/IFIP International Workshop on Reliable Networks
Design and Modeling (RNDM), Almaty, September 2013.
2. Egemen K. Çetinkaya, Mohammed J.F. Alenazi, Yufei Cheng, Andrew M. Peck,
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Reliable Networks Design and Modeling (RNDM), St. Petersburg, October 2012,
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benz, “Epidemic Routing Protocol Implementation in ns-3,” to appear in Workshop
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4. Mohammed J.F. Alenazi, Santosh Ajith Gogi, Dongsheng Zhang, Egemen K.
Çetinkaya, Justin P. Rohrer, and James P.G. Sterbenz, “Implementation of Aero-
nautical Network Protocols,” in Proceedings of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace Con-
ference, Boston, MA, August 2013.
3. Mohammed J.F. Alenazi, Egemen K. Çetinkaya, Justin P. Rohrer, and James
P.G. Sterbenz, “Implementation of the AeroRP and AeroNP Protocols in Python,”
in Proceedings of the 48th International Telemetering Conference (ITC), San Diego,
CA, October 2012.
2. Mohammed J.F. Alenazi, Cenk Sahin, Justin P. Rohrer, and James P.G. Ster-
benz, “Design Improvement and Implementation of 3D Gauss-Markov Mobility
Model” in Proceedings of the 48th International Telemetering Conference (ITC),
San Diego, CA, October 2012.
1. Mohammed J.F. Alenazi, Santosh Ajith Gogi, Dongsheng Zhang, Egemen K.
Çetinkaya, Justin P. Rohrer, and James P.G. Sterbenz, “ANTP Protocol Suite
Software Implementation Architecture in Python,” in Proceedings of the 47th In-
ternational Telemetering Conference (ITC), Las Vegas, NV, October 2011.
1.6 Organization
In this chapter we give the overview and motivation performed for this dissertation. The
rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents background that
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includes graph theory and graph robustness metrics. Graph models are presented in
Chapter 3, which includes graph datasets, graph attack models, graph robustness mea-
sures. Network design and improvement algorithm are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5
presents evaluation of network resilience for our algorithms and a comprehensive com-
parison. Conclusions and future work are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, a complete
set of graph improvement results is presented in Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter provides background and related work relevant to this dissertation. In Sec-
tion 2.1, we present the algorithmic complexity associated with resilient network design
and show the algorithmic complexity for computing an optimal solution for adding links
to a graph to gain a maximum or a minimum objective function by exhaustive search.
This section also discusses the greedy algorithm approach to improve the design of a
given network. In Section 2.2, we present several graph robustness metrics and their ap-
plication in network design and robustness evaluation. Finally, we present a framework
used to quantify network resilience in the face of challenges and attacks in Section 2.3.
2.1 Network Design and Algorithmic Complexity
Network design and optimization has been studied in the past decades [15,16] and many
problems in this field are considered to be NP-hard [17–20]. Several monographs provide
in-depth coverage of the topic [21–24]. In this section, in addition to the discussion of
optimal solution via exhaustive search, we briefly present some of the recent work relevant
to ours.
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2.1.1 Optimal Solution Complexity
Given a graph G = (N,L), |N | is the number of nodes (vertices) and |L| is the number
of links (edges); the number of complement links in the graph is |Ḡ|. There are two main
generic constraints associated with adding a set of links to a graph. The first constraint
is the total cost of adding the links, also called the budget constraint. In the worst-case
scenario, the optimal solution for the budget constraint requires examining all subsets of
the compliment links set. Hence, the algorithm complexity for the budget constraint is
defined as:
Tc(G) = O(2
|L̄|) (2.1)
Secondly, The optimal solution with the number of links constrained requires examining
all subsets with size n of the compliment links set. Hence, in the worst-case scenario, the
algorithm complexity for the number of links constrained is defined as:
Tc(G) = O(
(
|L̄|
n
)
) (2.2)
Both optimal solutions grow exponentially as the size of the graph increases, which makes
them impractical approaches for large-size networks.
2.1.2 Network Design Optimal and Heuristic Algorithms
As the exhaustive search approach fails to be a practical way to provide optimal solu-
tions, heuristic algorithms have been developed to add links between a random pair of
nodes and two low-degree nodes to improve the connectivity of graphs [25]. The largest
connected component has been measured as an objective function on synthetically gen-
erated graphs [25]. Another algorithm has been introduced to improve the robustness of
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the networks, in which some links were rewired [26]. Most relevant to our work in this
research, an algorithm that minimizes the maximum node betweenness of the graph has
been applied to synthetically generated Erdős-Rényi and Barabási-Albert graphs [27,28].
2.1.3 Greedy Algorithms
Greedy algorithms are considered a heuristic approach, which yield feasible solution with
local optimum [29]. Given an objective function, the greedy algorithm constructs a
feasible solution by selecting one item from a candidate set to maximize or minimize the
given objective function. The algorithmic computational complexity for selecting one
item is the product of the size of the candidate set and the computational complexity
for executing this item. For some problems such as the shortest path, greedy algorithms
yield an optimal solution [30]. However, the greedy algorithm does not always guarantee
an optimal solution for other problems such as the 0-1 knapsack problem [31]. Since
several network design problems have been proven to belong to NP-hard and others
are still open-problems, we employ greedy algorithms, which yields feasible solution in
polynomial time to improve network resilience via cost-efficient link additions.
2.1.4 Related Work
Several studies have been done to quantify graph robustness against targeted attacks and
random failures. Here, we present their work in terms of the proposed robustness metrics
and how they have been evaluated. The formula of each metric and its algorithmic
complexity are presented in Section 2.2.
Path diversity is a metric that measures disjoint nodes and links between alternative paths
between two communicating nodes. The total graph diversity (TGD) is the average path
diversity among all node pairs [32]. The TGD has shown better accuracy in predicting
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survivability of synthetic and real networks when compared to other graph metrics such
as clustering coëficcient, average hop count, and betweenness [32]. This metric has been
also used to measure network resilience against node and link failures of real-world service
provider networks.
Algebraic connectivity has been studied by several researchers [33–35]. It has been shown
that algebraic connectivity is more informative and accurate than average node degree
when characterizing network resilience [34]. Another study improved synthetically gen-
erated Erdős-Rényi random and Barabási-Albert graphs in terms of adding links to the
existing topology [33]. On the other hand, one study shows that algebraic connectivity
is not tightly related to graph robustness via simulating node and link removals of sev-
eral random graph types [36]. Furthermore, network optimization can be accomplished
by means of rewiring while keeping the number of edges constant [35]. In another re-
search, algebric connectivity has been used to add new links to improve the connectivity
of graphs [33].
Weighted spectral distribution (WS) has been introduced to analyze the Internet topol-
ogy [37]. Another study has been done to compare WS with other robustness metrics
against geographic correlated failures and showed that WS is a better measure to eval-
uate geographically correlated vulnerable links and nodes [38]. In this study, WS has
been compared to average node degree, average shortest path, network diameter, network
criticality, and algebraic connectivity to measure network survivability against correlated
failures in real-world weighted networks. The results have shown that WS is the most
versatile measure in evaluating such failures.
Natural connectivity is a spectral graph metric that has been compared to algebraic
connectivity using a set of structural and random graphs to examine robustness against
node and link removals [39]. In this research, natural connectivity has been compared
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other measures such as edge connectivity and algebraic connectivity in the presence of
link failures of real-world networks. The results have shown that the natural connectivity
measures connectivity changes more precisely than algebraic connectivity.
Network criticality is a spectral graph metric that measures the robustness of a network
against topological changes [40]. A smaller value of network criticality means higher net-
work robustness. Furthermore, this metric has been compared to algebraic connectivity,
average node degree, and average node betweenness. However, this study concluded that
there is no unique graph metric that can capture robustness and connectivity [41].
The spectral gap is also a spectral graph metric that has been used to measure the
robustness of the graph against targeted attacks [42]. A small spectral gap value indicates
a smaller number of articulation points that might partition the network once a node or
a link is removed [43].
Effective graph resistance is a spectral graph metric that measures the robustness of
network against node or link removals [44]. This metric has been compared to algebraic
connectivity in terms of measuring the connectivity of several random types and real-
world networks. The structure of this metric is similar to network criticality since both
metrics use the Moore-Penrose inverse of Laplacian matrix of the given graph [40].
2.2 Graph Robustness Metrics
In this section, we present and discuss several graph, node, and link metrics associated
with graph robustness.
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2.2.1 Flow Robustness
Flow robustness is a graph metric that measures the ratio of the number of reliable
flows to the number of total flows in the network [11, 32]. A flow is considered reliable
if at least one of its paths remains unbroken by the link or node failures. The number
of total flows is the maximum number of flows, which is n(n − 1)/2 flows for n nodes.
This metric captures the ability for the network nodes to communicate with each other
after a node or link is removed. The range for flow robustness values is [0, 1] where 1
indicates that all the nodes can communicate with each other and 0 means there is no
node-pair communication in the whole network i.e, there are no links in the graph. The
flow robustness metric can be used to model packet delivery ratio (PDR), where packet
buffering is disabled. For example, the flow robustness value can represent the upper
bound value for the constant bit rate (CBR) traffic model with no buffering mechanism.
To calculate flow robustness, let G = (N,L) be the graph representing the given network.
Let {Ci; 1 < i < k} be the set of components in graph G. The flow robustness FR is
computed using:
FR(G) =
∑k
i=1 |Ci|(|Ci| − 1)
|V |(|V | − 1)
, 0 ≤ FR ≤ 1 (2.3)
The algorithmic complexity to calculate FR is heavily dependent on the complexity to
find the number of components in a given graph, which is O(|N | + |L|) [45]. Since the
maximum value for k is |N |, the worst-case complexity for the summations is also |N |.
Thus, the algorithmic complexity for calculating the flow robustness is O(|N |+|L|+|N |),
which can be simplified to O(|N |+ |L|).
To illustrate how the flow robustness captures the connectivity of graphs, we compute
it for six graphs with four nodes and different connectivity as shown in Figure 2.1. In
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this example, the first two graphs: G1 and G2 have one component each with a different
number of links. G3 and G4 have two components each with the same number of links.
G5 has three components with one link and G6 has four components and no links. For
each graph in Figure 2.1, we calculate the flow robustness using Equation 2.3. The flow
robustness values for each graph are presented in Table 2.1. Even though G1 and G2
have different number of links, they have the same flow robustness value of 1 because
there exists a reliable flow between each pair of nodes. G3 and G4 have the same number
of nodes, links, and components; however, they have a different flow robustness values.
G3 has a larger flow robustness value than G4 since it has more reliable flows. G5 has a
relatively low flow robustness value since it just has one reliable flow. Finally, G6 has a
0 value of flow robustness because there are no reliable flows in the graph.
0 
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G1 
0 
2 
1 
3 
G2 
0 
2 
1 
3 
G3 
0 
2 
1 
3 
G4 
0 
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1 
3 
G5 
0 
2 
1 
3 
G6 
Figure 2.1: Unweighed flow robustness calculation example
2.2.2 Graph Centrality Metrics
For a given graph G = (N,L) with a set of nodes N and links L, centrality metrics
show the importance of a link or a node to the graph. Since the link or node importance
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Table 2.1: Flow robustness values in six graphs
Graph Nodes Links Components Flow Robustness (FR)
G1 4 4 1 1.00
G2 4 3 1 1.00
G3 4 2 2 0.50
G4 4 2 2 0.33
G5 4 1 3 0.17
G6 4 0 4 0.00
varies from one application to another, several metrics have been introduced as indicators
to identify central nodes based on the need of the application. Here, we focus on the
commonly used metrics: betweenness, closeness, and degree centrality [46–48].
Shortest path
The shortest path is not a centrality metric itself but since it is used as the basis of
several centrality metrics, we present its definition for both unweighted and weighted
graphs. For unweighted graphs, the shortest path of nodes i and j is the path with
minimum number of hops. It is denoted as:
dij = min{xih + ...+ xkj} (2.4)
where xih + ...+ xkj represents all possible paths between node i and node j [49].
For weighted graphs, the shortest path of two nodes i and j is the path from nodes i and
j with the minimum total cost. For communication networks, if the weight represents
a connectivity measure, then the cost is the inverse of the weighted because paths with
higher connectivity are preferred. As a result, the path with minimum total cost is in
fact the path with high total connectivity [49,50]. Hence, the shortest path of two node
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i and node j in weighted graphs is defined as:
dwij = min{
1
wih
+ ...+
1
wkj
} (2.5)
Since the sum of the total cost can dominate the value of the weighted shortest path,
another approach introduces a tuning parameter to control the impact of either total
cost or number of hops in the weighted shortest path [49]. The equation to determine
the shortest path is defined as follows:
dwαij = min{
1
(wih)α
+ ...+
1
(wkj)α
} (2.6)
where α is a positive tuning factor that can be set based on application. When α = 0 the
weight impact is completely ignored and the equation becomes identical to Equation 2.4.
However, when α = 1 the weight impacts dominates and the equation is identical to
Equation 2.5.
Some other common graph metrics such as eccentricity, radius, and diameter provide
statistical graph values of all node-pair shortest paths. The eccentricity ε(n) is the
longest of the shortest paths between node n and every other node. The graph radius
R(G) is the shortest of the shortest paths of graph G. The graph diameter D(G) is the
longest of the shortest paths of graph G.
The algorithmic complexity to determine the shortest path from one node to all other
nodes using Dijkstra’s algorithm is O(|N |2) [51]. To determine the shortest paths among
all pairs in the graph, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm has an algorithmic complexity of
O(|N |3) [52].
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Degree
One of the simplest and yet most commonly used centrality metric is degree centrality,
defined as the number of link incidents to a node and can be viewed as the importance
of connectivity of a node [53]. The degree is a local centrality metric since it depends
only on the number of links locally connected. In communication networks, nodes with a
high degree are considered to be more important than nodes with a lower degree because
they they provide connectivity to many other links.
For weighted graphs, one approach defines the weighted node degree as the sum of link
weights connected to that node [50, 54]. However, this approach can be ambiguous in
some cases; for example, if we have a node with just one link of weight 5 and another
node with three links of weight 1. The weighted degree for the first node is 5 and for the
second node is 3. Even though the second node has more attached links (higher weighted
degree), the weighted degree is smaller. Another approach tries to tackle this ambiguity
by adding a tuning factor α to control the impact of weights on calculating the weighted
degree [49]. Hence, the weighted degree of node i is formally defined as:
CwαD (i) = k
(1−α)
i
(
N∑
j=1
wij
)α
(2.7)
where α is a positive tuning factor that can be set based on application, ki is the un-
weighted degree of node i, and wij represents the link weight between ni and nj [49].
Assigning α = 0 ignores the effect of cost and yields the unweighted degree equation. On
the other hand, assigning α = 1 ignores the effect of unweighted degree and yields the
sum of link weights for the given node. The algorithmic complexity to determine a node
degree is O(|N |).
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Assortativity
Assortativity As(G) is a graph metrics that measures the degree similarity among ad-
jacent nodes for a given graph G [55]. For example, in a uniform-degree graph the
assortativity is 1. The assortativity is defined as:
As(G) =
m−1
∑
i jiki − [m−1
∑
i
1
2
(ji + ki)]
2
m−1
∑
i
1
2
(j2i + k
2
i )− [m−1
∑
i
1
2
(ji + ki)]2
(2.8)
where ji, ki are the degrees of the nodes at the ith link and m is the number of links.
Betweenness
Betweenness is centrality graph metric that can used for both nodes and links. Node be-
tweenness is defined as the number of shortest paths through a node. On the other hand,
link betweenness is defined the number of the shortest paths through a link. Betweenness
is considered to have global significance since the betweenness value is impacted by the
whole structure of the graph [56]. In communication networks, nodes with high between-
ness exhibit more importance as they carry more packet flows and these failures results
in significant traffic disruption and rerouting.
CB(v) =
∑
i
∑
j
gij(v)
gij
, v 6= i 6= j (2.9)
For weighed graphs, the number of shortest paths gij is computed using the weighted
shortest path presented in Equation 2.5 and denoted as gwij. The weighted betweenness
is defined as:
CwB (v) =
∑
i
∑
j
gwij(v)
gwij
, v 6= i 6= j (2.10)
To control the impact of cost, the number of shortest paths gwij is computed using the
weighted shortest path with α tuning parameter presented in Equation 2.6 and denoted
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as gwij. The α tuned weighted betweenness is defined as:
CwαB (v) =
∑
i
∑
j
gwαij (v)
gwαij
, v 6= i 6= j (2.11)
where α is a positive tuning factor that can be set based on application [49]. The
algorithmic complexity to determine node betweenness is O(|N ||L|) [57].
Closeness
For unweighted graphs, closeness is a node centrality metric that measures the mean
distance from the node to other nodes [53, 58]. It is defined as:
Ci = (
|V |∑
j=1
dij)
−1 (2.12)
dij is the distance between nodes i and j presented in Equation 2.4.
For weighted graphs, weighted closeness of node i is computed using the weighted shortest
path presented in Equation 2.5 and defined as:
Cwi = (
|V |∑
j=1
dwij)
−1 (2.13)
To control the impact of the weight, the weighted closeness of node i is computed using the
weighted shortest path with α tuning parameter presented in Equation 2.6 and defined
as:
Cwαi = (
|V |∑
j=1
dwαij )
−1 (2.14)
In communication networks, closeness indicates the efficiency of a message’s diffusion in
a network. The algorithmic complexity to determine the closeness for a given graph is
O(|N |3) [59].
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2.2.3 Graph Spectra Robustness Metrics
Let G = (N,L) be an unweighted, undirected graph with |N | nodes and |L| links. The
topology of G can be represented by an adjacency matrix, incidence matrix, Laplacian
matrix, or normalized Laplacian matrix [60, 61]. Given a symmetric adjacency matrix,
A(G), with no self-loops where aii = 0, aij = aji = 1 if there is a link between {ni,nj}, and
aij = aji = 0 if there is no link between {ni,nj}. Then, the Laplacian matrix of G is the
difference between the diagonal matrix and the adjacency matrix; L(G) = D(G)−A(G).
The diagonal matrix, D(G), represents node degrees, dii = deg(vi). The normalized
Laplacian matrix L(G) can be represented:
L(G)(i, j) =

1, if i = j and di 6= 0
− 1√
didj
, if vi and vj are adjacent
0, otherwise
Spectral graph theory studies the relationship between graph structural properties and
eigenvalues and eigenvector of their adjacency, incidence, and Laplacian matrices. This
topic has been extensively covered in several monographs [60–64]. For weighted graphs,
using the weighted degree definition presented in Equation 2.7, the weighted graph spec-
tra can be computed using the same method for the unweighted graphs [65].
Algebraic connectivity
Algebraic connectivity, denoted as a(G) = λ2 has been studied by several researchers [33–
35]. It has been shown that algebraic connectivity is more informative and accurate than
average node degree when characterizing network resilience [34]. Moreover, we have
shown algebraic connectivity [9,66,67] and diversity [32] are predictive of flow robustness
of graphs. Three synthetically generated topologies (i.e. Watts-Strogatz small-world,
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Gilbert random, and Barabási-Albert scale-free) have been improved using link rewiring
in which the objective is to increase the algebraic connectivity [35]. It has been shown
that algebraic connectivity increases the most if links are rewired between weakly con-
nected nodes. Another study improved synthetically generated random Erdős-Rényi and
Barabási-Albert graphs in terms of adding links to the existing topology [33].
Spectral gap
The spectral gap, denoted as ∆λ = λn − λn−1, is the difference between the largest and
second largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. The spectral gap has been used to
show the robustness of the graph against targeted attacks [42]. A small spectral gap
indicates articulation points that might partition the network once a node or a link is
removed [43].
Natural connectivity
Natural connectivity, denoted as λ̄, is a scaled average eigenvalue of the graph adjacency
matrix [39]. A larger value of λ̄ indicates, more robustness to link or nodes removals.
Natural connectivity has been compared to algebraic connectivity using a set of structural
and random graphs to predict robustness against node and link removals [39]. The value
of λ̄ is calculated as follows:
λ̄ = ln [
1
n
n∑
j=1
eλj ] (2.15)
where λj is the jth eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.
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Weighted spectrum
Weighted spectral distribution, denoted as WS, has been introduced to analyze Internet
topology [37]. The value of WS is calculated as follows:
WS(G,N) =
n∑
i=1
(1− λi)N (2.16)
where λi is the ith eigenvalue of the normalized Laplacian matrices and N is the number
of cycles being measured [37]. In this research, we use N = 4 since it is related to the
number of disjoint paths [37,38]. A study has been conducted to compare WS with other
robustness metrics against geographic correlated failures and showed that WS is a better
measure to evaluate geographically correlated vulnerable links and nodes [38].
Network criticality
Network criticality, denoted as τ̂ , is a graph metric that measures the robustness of
network against topological changes [40]. A smaller value of τ̂ indicates higher network
robustness. Moreover, this metric has been compared with other robustness metrics [41].
We note that this metric is also called total resistance distance [68]. The value of τ̂ is
calculated as follows:
τ̂ =
2
n− 1
Trace(L+) (2.17)
where n is the number of nodes in a given graph, Trace(L+) is the trace of the Moore-
Penrose inverse of Laplacian matrix of the given graph [40].
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Effective graph resistance
Effective graph resistance, denoted as RG, is a graph metric that measures the robustness
of network against node or link removals. The value of RG is calculated as follows:
RG = N
N∑
i=2
1
λi
(2.18)
A normalized version is called effective graph conductance C∗, which is defined as:
C∗ =
N − 1
RG
(2.19)
where the values of C∗ lie in the interval [0, 1].
Graph spectra algorithmic computational complexity
Given a graph with n nodes and m links, the corresponding adjacency matrix, incidence
matrix, Laplacian matrix, and normalized Laplacian matrix are of size n× n. Using the
worst-case algorithmic analysis, big-O, the computational complexity for determining
the eigenvalues of the graph is O(n2). Thus, the algorithm complexity of calculating τ̂ is
O(mn
3
2 log(n)) [40], where m is the number of links.
2.2.4 Path Diversity
Algorithms and mechanisms are necessary to defend networks and to make them resilient
against challenges [7]. One such mechanism is diversity and it has been the subject of a
number the published works in the field of network resilience. Diversity is used to enhance
bandwidth, delay, and loss rate of media streaming applications [69]. Path diversity is
used in the optical domain to route around failed nodes or to split traffic for a better
utilization of network resources [70]. Diverse routing is necessary for multihoming to
improve the service delivery of provider networks [71, 72]. While the path diversity of a
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graph is essential for survivable design, it can be improved by addition of links in a given
graph using an improvement algorithm.
A path between a source s and a destination d is the set of nodes and links that form
a loop-free connection. Diverse paths between node pairs strengthen the ability of a
network to withstand attacks and correlated failures. If the alternative paths have no
common nodes or links they are disjoint, and if there are common network nodes or
links, they are partially disjoint. Path diversity has been studied from a topological
perspective [73–75], as well as in terms of multipath routing [70,72,76–82], and multipath
transport [32,83]. Furthermore, multipath routing has been studied to improve the QoS
(Quality of Service) of networks [78,79], the resilience of interdomain routing [76,80], and
the survivability in optical networks [70,81,82]. Moreover, finding disjoint paths between
a node pair is considered to be a NP-complete problem [84, 85]. Next, we explain path
diversity and the path diversity of a graph [11,32].
Path diversity definition
Given a shortest path and an alternative path between two nodes in a graph, the path
diversity of the alternative is defined as the ratio of the number of disjoint elements (nodes
and links) between the shortest path and alternative path to the number of elements in
the shortest path. Given a (source s, destination d) node pair, a path P between them
is a set containing all links L and all intermediate nodes N [32],
P = L ∪N (2.20)
and the length of this path |P | is the combined total number of elements in L and N .
Let the shortest path between a given (s, d) pair be P0. Then, for any other path Pk
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between the same source and destination, the definition of the diversity function [32,76]
D(Pk) with respect to P0 as:
D(Pk) = 1−
|Pk ∩ P0|
|P0|
(2.21)
The path diversity has a value of 1 if Pk and P0 are completely disjoint and a value of
0 if Pk and P0 are identical. This measure captures the diversity with respect to both
nodes and links on alternative paths [32]. As an example, we illustrate finding the path
diversity of the paths between node 0 and 2 in the graph shown in Figure 2.2.
3 
1 2 0 
Figure 2.2: Path definition example
There are four possible paths namely: P0 = [0, 1, 2], P1 = [0, 3, 2], P2 = [0, 1, 3, 2], and
P3 = [0, 3, 1, 2]. The shortest path in this graph is P0 so its path diversity is zero.
However, to calculate the path diversity for P1, we first convert the paths to the path
element sets. For P0, the path elements set is {(0, 1), 1, (1, 2)}. The tuples (0, 1) and
(1, 2) represent the links while the element 1 represents the node 1 in the path. We do
not include the source and destination nodes in order to have a path diversity of 1 when
the two paths are fully disjoint. Using the same method, the path elements set for P1 is
{(0, 3), 3, (3, 2)}. Using Equation 2.21, D(P1) = 1− 03 = 1. To find the path diversity for
P2, the path elements set for P2 is {(0, 1), 1, (1, 3), 3, (3, 2)}. Again, using Equation 2.21,
D(P2) = 1 − 23 =
1
3
. Finally the path diversity of P3, using the same procedure is
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D(P3) = 1 − 23 =
1
3
. We note that converting a path to its elements method assumes
directed graphs. In this research, since we study the path diversity of undirected graphs,
we modify the method to work with undirected graphs. Thus, to construct a path to
element set, we start with the same method for the directed graph. Then, for each link
(a, b) in the resulting set, we add (b, a) to the set.
Capturing path diversity of a graph
TGD (total graph diversity) is the average of the EPD (effective path diversity) values of
all node pairs in a given graph [32] and TGD measures the path diversity of a graph as
a single value. EPD is the normalized sum of path diversities for a selected set of paths
connecting a node pair (s, d). First, we find the k diverse paths using the algorithm
presented in Section 4.2.1. Then, we remove zero diversity paths from the list of returned
paths because they do not add any additional diversity. The returned diverse path is
denoted as Ps,d = {P1, P2, ... , Pm}, where m ≤ k, since-zero diversity paths are removed
from the set. To calculate EPD, we use the exponential function:
EPD = 1− e−λksd (2.22)
where ksd is the sum of all non-zero diversity paths defined as:
ksd =
m∑
i=1
D(Pi) (2.23)
where D(Pi) is the non-zero path diversity of the i-th path with respect to the P0. In
Equation 2.22, λ is an experimentally determined constant that scales the impact of ksd
based on the utility of this added diversity [32]. For a given pair of nodes, the range of
EPD is between [0, 1) where 0 means that there is no diversity in between the two nodes
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as there are no alternative paths connecting the pair. When the EPD approaches 1, it
means that the network provides high path diversity [32].
2.3 Analytical Resilience Framework
An evaluation framework has been developed to quantify network resilience using a two-
dimensional state space as the network is challenged by failures, attacks, or large-scale
disasters [1, 7, 86]. We will use this framework to show the resilience of a given network
during targeted attacks. Resilience R is a function of network operational state N and
service state P. First, let NS be a set of operational states, NS = {N1, . . . ,Nk}. The
framework divides the operational state into three regions: normal operation, partially
degraded, and severely degraded. Second, the framework characterizes the service provided
at a given network layer. Let PS be a set of service states, PS = {P1, . . . ,Pk}. Similarly,
the service space P is divided into acceptable, impaired, and unacceptable regions [1,86,87]
Under normal conditions, the network continues to operate in a given state corresponding
to normal operational and service states. When the network is under attack, which
causes a large degradation in the operational state, the service may also be impaired
below the acceptable service specification. A significant change in either dimension leads
to a network state transition. The framework formulates that challenges in the form of
adverse events transform the network from one state to another based on the severity of
the event [1].
Network resilience can be evaluated in terms of the various network state transitions
under the presence of challenges. The network operational space N is divided into nor-
mal operation, partially degraded, and severely degraded regions as shown in Figure 2.3.
Similarly, the service space P is divided into acceptable, impaired, and unacceptable re-
gions. The framework then quantifies the resilience R for a particular scenario as the area
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Figure 2.3: Resilience R measured in state space [1]
under the resilience trajectory, shown by the shaded triangular area under the S0 → Sc
trajectory in Figure 2.3 [1].
2.4 Summary
We presented the network design and improvement algorithmic complexity and showed
the complexity of computing an optimal solution by an exhaustive search. In addition,
we discussed using a greedy algorithm for network design. Then, we discussed several
graph robustness metrics for un- and weighted graphs and discussed their applications
in network design and robustness evaluation. Finally, we presented a framework used to
quantify network resilience in the face of challenges and attacks.
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Chapter 3
Graph Models
In this chapter, we present our dataset, our centrality-balanced robustness metrics, our
weighted flow robustness metric, graph attack models, and how network resilience is
measured. Our dataset includes baseline graphs, random graphs, and real-world graphs.
We present our graph robustness metrics that capture how a given graph’s centrality
is balanced. We then present our weighted flow robustness and show it is used to cap-
ture network resilience. After that, we show several centrality-based attack models and
how they are used to measure network resilience and we present our model to convert
unweighted graphs to weighted graphs using node populations and link betweenness.
Finally, we present how we use flow robustness to measure network resilience against
centrality attacks.
3.1 Graph Dataset
In this section, we present our datasets, which consist of four categories: baseline, ran-
dom, unweighted real-world, and weighted real-world graphs. For each category, we
present several graph types and discuss their properties. In all our models, we use simple
undirected graphs.
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3.1.1 Baseline Graphs
We select a set of graphs with known structures to give some intuition of each graph
metric during the evaluation process. This set includes: full-mesh, wheel, grid, torus,
ladder, ring, barbell, linear, binary-tree, and star graphs. A full-mesh graph, also called
complete, has a link between every node pair. A star graph has one node designated
as the root and a set of other nodes, while there is a link between the root and every
other node. A wheel graph is a star graph with a link connecting every adjacent leaf.
A grid graph has a m × n nodes placed in a grid form with m rows and n columns. In
this graph, there is a link connecting every adjacent vertical and horizontal node pair. A
torus graph is a grid graph with a link connecting every left and right node in each row
and a link connecting every top and bottom node in each column. A ladder graph is a
special case of the grid graph such that n is always 2. A linear graph, also called a path,
is a set of nodes placed as a line in which there is a link connecting every adjacent node
pair. A ring graph, also called a circle, is a linear graph with the end nodes connected by
a link. A binary-tree graph has one node designated as a root with two children nodes.
Each child has at most two children with a hight h defining the length of the shortest
path between the root and the leaves. A barbell has two full mesh graphs and a link
connecting them. A set of examples for the baseline graphs are shown in Figure 3.1.
3.1.2 Random Graphs
In this section, we present three random graph models to generate our dataset for ro-
bustness metrics evaluation.
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wheel 
  
star 
barbell ladder binary tree ring 
linear 
torus 
grid full mesh 
Figure 3.1: Several examples of baseline graphs
Table 3.1: Properties of baseline graphs
Graph Nodes Links Avg. Node Degree Radius Diameter Avg. Shortest Path
full mesh 10 45 9.00 1 1 1.00
torus 9 18 4.00 2 2 1.50
wheel 10 18 3.60 1 2 1.60
barbell 12 17 2.83 4 7 3.48
binary tree 15 14 1.87 3 6 3.50
ladder 10 13 2.60 3 5 2.33
grid 9 12 2.67 2 4 2.00
ring 10 10 2.00 5 5 2.78
linear 10 9 1.80 5 9 3.67
star 10 9 1.80 1 2 1.80
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Gilbert graphs
The Gilbert random graph model is one of the earliest models to construct random
graphs [88]. Given a number of nodes n and connectivity probability p, the random
graph model G(n, p) constructs a graph with n nodes and m links are connected with
probability p. Another similar graph model is the Erdős-Rényi (ER). The random graph
model ER(n,m) generates a graph with n nodes and randomly connected m links.
Waxman graphs
The Waxman model provides a probabilistic way of connecting nodes in a graph [89].
Given two nodes {u, v} with a Euclidean distance d(u, v) between them, the probability
of connecting these two nodes is:
P (u, v) = βe
−d(u,v)
Lα (3.1)
where β, α ∈ (0, 1] and L is the maximum distance between any two nodes. Increasing
β increases the link density and a large value of α corresponds to a high ratio of long
links to short links. In this research, the Waxman model node locations are uniformly
distributed. It has been shown that Waxman graphs exhibit mesh-like properties of
logical-level networks [90].
Gabriel graphs
Gabriel graphs are useful in modeling graphs with geographic connectivity that resemble
grids [91, 92]. In a Gabriel graph, two nodes are connected directly if and only if there
are no other nodes that fall inside the circle whose diameter is given by the line segment
joining the two nodes. The node locations are generated randomly using a uniform
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distribution with a range of [0, 1] for both x-axis and y-axis. It has been shown that
Gabriel graphs exhibit grid-like properties of physical-level networks [90].
3.1.3 Unweighted Real-World Networks
For our real-world networks, we use five physical ISP networks. We make use of the pub-
licly available: AT&T [93], Sprint [94] Internet2 [95], Level 3 [96], and CORONET [97,98],
fiber-level topologies. CORONET is a synthetic fiber topology designed to be representa-
tive of service provider fiber deployments. Moreover, we present some well-known graph
metrics for each graph to provide an insight of the graph properties, including number of
nodes, number of links, degree of connectivity, radius, diameter, and average hop count
as shown in Table 3.2. A set of all the unweighted maps is shown in Figure A.1.
Table 3.2: Physical graph properties of three service provider networks
Graph Nodes Links Avg. Node Degree Radius Diameter Avg. Shortest Path
AT&T 361 466 2.58 19 37 13.57
Sprint 263 311 2.37 19 37 14.78
CORONET 75 99 2.64 9 17 6.45
Internet2 57 65 2.28 8 14 6.69
Level 3 99 132 2.67 10 19 7.65
3.1.4 Weighted Real-World Networks
We use several weighted real-world graphs for physical networks from The Internet Topol-
ogy Zoo [99]. The properties of these topologies are shown in Table 3.3. KAREN or
REANNZ (Research and Education Advanced Network New Zealand Ltd) is the Crown-
owned company that owns and operates a high-speed, unrestricted broadband network
for New Zealand education, research and innovation communities [100]. InternetMCI
represents the physical topology of MCI Communications Corp, which later merged with
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WorldCom [101]. CARNet (Croatian Academic and Research Network) is a public insti-
tution that today operates under the Croatian ministry of science, education and sports in
the field of information and communication technologies [102]. GÉANT is the European
research and education network that interconnects several institutions across Europe,
supporting research in areas such as energy, the environment, space, and medicine [103].
A set of all the weighted maps is shown in Figure A.2.
Table 3.3: Weighted graph properties of five service provider networks
Graph Nodes Links Avg. Node Degree Radius Diameter Avg. Hopcont
KAREN 25 28 2.24 4 7 3.42
InternetMCI 19 33 3.47 3 4 2.39
CARNet 44 43 1.95 3 6 2.99
GÉANT 37 56 3.03 4 7 3.46
3.1.5 Physical Level Networks Dataset Constraint
Each improvement algorithm selects new links from a candidate set. All possible candi-
date links are located in the input graph complement. However, this set may contain very
long links that are not practical to be added to a physical graph. For example, adding a
physical fiber link between Los Angeles and Boston is unlikely to be feasible for providers
given the high cost associated by adding this link. In our implementation, the candidate
set only contains links that are not longer than a specified threshold value. Therefore,
this raises the question of what the best threshold value should be. In this research,
we choose the current maximum length link in the input graph to be the threshold for
removing long links from the graph complement links. We assume this value gives a good
indicator for the maximum link length a provider can afford.
40
3.1.6 Population-Based Weighted Graph Model
There are many real-world and synthetic physical level networks available as datasets for
researchers [104]. However, most of these networks are modeled using unweighted graphs
because most providers are unwilling to disclose their network topological properties in or-
der to maintain security and competitiveness. While topologies can be inferred or mined
from public documents, capacity information is much harder to obtain. A few weighted
real-world graphs are available for educational institutes presented in Section 3.1.4. For
the synthetic graphs, most graph generating algorithms deal with determining the link
existing among a given number of nodes. Modeling physical level networks using weighted
graphs provides a more accurate description of their behavior against random and tar-
geted attacks. Thus, in this section, we introduce a population-based weighted graph
model to assign weights to both nodes and links of a given unweighted physical level
graph.
For a given graph G = (N,L) with set of nodes N and links L, we introduce a weighting
function w(l) to assign weight to a given link l ∈ L. In physical-level graphs, nodes rep-
resent cities and links represent fiber cables. Our weight function utilizes city population
and link betweenness to estimate link capacity. Although link capacity is measured in
b/s, our objective is not to accurately determine the capacity but rather determine a
correlated capacity function. We assume that nodes with higher population are more
important than nodes with lower population. We also assume that a link between two
nodes with high population should have higher capacity than a link between two nodes
with low population unless they are transitions between other high capacity cities. The
weight function w(l) is calculated as:
w(l) = Pop(n1)× Pop(n2) (3.2)
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where Pop(n) return the population of node n and the link l is connected by nodes n1
and n2.
To illustrate this model by a simple example, we present an 8-node physical-level network
shown in Figure 3.2. For simplifications, we assign arbitrary small population values for
each node while trying to keep them correlated to the actual population values as shown in
Table 3.4. Observe that Kansas City, MO and St. Louis, MO have the highest population
values. First, we calculate the population product and normalized betweenness as shown
in Table 3.5. Using Equation 3.2, we calculate the assigned link weight based on the
population product and link betweenness.
4 2 
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6 
0: Kansas City, MO 
1: Omaha, NE 
2: Topeka, KS 
3: Lee's Summit, MO 
4: Columbia, MO 
5: St. Louis, MO 
6: Litchfield, IL 
7: Madisonville, KY 
Figure 3.2: An 8-node physical-level network
As shown in Table 3.5, the highest assigned link weight is 5.71, which belongs to the link
connecting Kansas City, MO and Columbia, MO. The second highest assigned link weight
is 5.36, which belongs to the link connecting Columbia, MO and St Louis, MO. These two
links have the highest weights because they carry a larger number of connections than
other links as they have the highest betweenness value. We observe that these two links
have higher assigned weights than the assigned weight for the link connecting Kansas
City, MO and Omaha, NE, even though the latter has higher population product.
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Table 3.4: Population-based weighted example cities and their population
Index City Population
0 Kansas City, MO, USA 5
1 Omaha, NE, USA 3
2 Topeka, KS, USA 2
3 Lee’s Summit, MO, USA 2
4 Columbia, MO, USA 2
5 St. Louis, MO, USA 5
6 Litchfield, IL, USA 2
7 Madisonville, KY, USA 3
Table 3.5: Physical graph properties of three service provider networks
Link Population Product Normalized Betweenness Assigned Weight
(0, 1) 15 0.25 3.75
(0, 2) 10 0.25 2.50
(0, 3) 10 0.25 2.50
(0, 4) 10 0.57 5.71
(4, 5) 10 0.54 5.36
(5, 6) 10 0.25 2.50
(5, 7) 15 0.25 3.75
3.1.7 Real-World Graphs Comparison
In this section, we compare our population-based model. We use two correlation func-
tions to study the relationship between the real-world capacity values and our model-
generated values. For linear comparison, we use the Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient, which yields 1 for perfect linear correlation, −1 for perfect inverse linear cor-
relation, and 0 for no correlation [105]. For non-linear comparison, we use Spearman’s
rank correlation non-linear coefficient, which yields 1 for perfect correlation, −1 for per-
fect inverse non-linear correlation, and 0 for no correlation [106]. Here, we study the
correlation between the actual capacity values of a real-world network and three gen-
erated values: link population Pop, link betweenness CB, and population-betweenness
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product Pop × CB. The link population Pop is the product of the population of the
two connecting nodes. The link betweenness CB is the normalized betweenness value of
the given link. the population-betweenness product Pop× CB is the product of the link
population and normalized betweenness. The correlation values are shown in Table 3.6,
which shows inconsistent results. For KAREN and InternetMCI, the linear correlation
for betweenness CB indicate a higher dependency than both Pop and Pop × CB. On
the other hand, for CARNet, the linear correlation value is 0.79, which indicates that
the actual link capacity values have high dependencies on link population. For GÉANT,
the linear correlation values are relatively low for all generated values. For non-linear
correlation, we see that actual link capacity values have high dependencies on link popu-
lation. For InternetMCI, the non-linear correlation for betweenness CB indicates higher
dependency than the link population Pop. For CARNet, the non-linear correlation values
show that population-betweenness product Pop × CB has slightly higher dependencies
than link population Pop and link betweenness CB.
From some of these results, we observe that the generated capacity values are comparable
to the actual capacity values. However, we speculate that these results are not consistent
because of two reasons. First, our weighted real-world graph dataset has only educational
networks, which are not necessarily designed to meet the demand of their city populations.
Second, these networks are connected to other networks through one or multiple nodes,
which makes the link betweenness values incorrect. For example, if CARNet network is
connected to GÉANT thorough via multiple nodes, the link betweenness for a particular
link for the combined network will be different compared to the two isolated graphs
betweenness values.
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Table 3.6: Correlation with real networks
Graph
Linear correlation Non-Linear correlation
Pop CB Pop× CB Pop CB Pop× CB
Karen -0.19 0.24 -0.15 0.51 0.38 0.50
InternetMCI -0.17 0.33 -0.15 0.00 0.43 0.03
CARNet 0.79 0.04 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.63
GÉANT 0.20 0.01 0.18 0.37 0.06 0.36
3.2 Centrality-Balanced Robustness
The high centrality nodes and links attract adversaries who can apply successful attacks
on a targeted network by disrupting a few nodes with high centrality. For example,
a star network has one central node with high degree. Attacking this node completely
disconnects the communication network. To measure the graph balanced-centrality prop-
erty, four metrics have been introduced [107]. First, the degree-balanced graph metric
σ2CD , is computed as the degree variance of all the nodes. Second, closeness-balanced
graph metric σ2CC , which is computed as the closeness variance of all the nodes. Third,
node-betweenness-balanced graph metric σ2CBv , which is computed as node-betweenness
variance of all the nodes. Fourth, link-betweenness-balanced graph metric σ2CBl
, which is
computed as node-betweenness variance of all the links.
3.3 Weighted Flow Robustness
The flow robustness metric, discussed in Section 2.2.1, considers only unweighted graphs.
The weights in communication networks can represent several properties. For example,
in physical level networks, they can represent fiber capacity while in wireless networks
the can represent link reliability or bandwidth. Since communication networks can be
modeled more realistically using weighted graphs, we propose a weighted flow robustness
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graph metric that captures both connectivity and total link capacity in a given capacity-
weighted graph. We assume that links with higher weights should contribute more to
the value of flow robustness than links with lower weights. For example in physical
level graphs, a fiber cut between two big cities with high link capacity should decrease
the value of flow robustness more than a fiber cut between two cities with small link
capacity. Before introducing the weighted flow robustness metric, we introduce a metric
called adjusted total capacity (ATC) to measure the total capacity of all links. The ATC
metric is defined as:
ATC(G) =
∑
w(l), l ∈ L (3.3)
The weighted flow robustness (WFR) is defined as the product of the unweighted flow
robustness (FR) and adjusted total capacity (ATC), which can be computed using:
WFR(G) = FR(G)× ATC(G) (3.4)
Using several graphs, presented in Figure 3.3, we show how the weighted flow robustness
(WFR) is computed using Equation 3.4. The results of calculating WFR are shown in
Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Calculating weighed flow robustness values
Graph Weighed flow robustness(WFR)
G1 19.00
G2 11.00
G3 3.00
G4 3.33
G5 0.33
G6 0.00
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Figure 3.3: Weighed flow robustness calculation example
3.4 Graph Attack Models
We use a graph-theoretic model to attack a given graph and show how its flow robustness
changes after each node removal. In this research, we use three centrality metrics: node
betweenness, node closeness, and node degree [56]. Hence, we have three attack models,
in which the node with the highest centrality is removed. The node-betweenness attack
targets the node through which the highest number of shortest paths pass. The node-
closeness attack targets the most central node in terms of hop count. The node-degree
attack targets the node with the highest number of connections. If the attack requires
removing multiple nodes, centrality metrics are recomputed upon attacking each node.
3.5 Measuring Network Resilience
In this section, we explain how to measure network resilience against a specific centrality-
based attack. Flow robustness measures the reachability of a given graph. However, it
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is not useful to distinguish between connected graphs. For example, the flow robustness
value for a full-mesh graph and a star graph is identical, which in this case is one. As
a solution, we introduce three robustness behavioral measures to calculate the sums
of flow robustness of a given network resilience against centrality-based attacks. The
robustness measures are: sums of flow robustness against degree attack (SFRD), sums
of flow robustness against closeness attack (SFRC), and sums of flow robustness against
betweenness attack (SFRB). Each measure captures resilience of a given network against
the associated attack. For example, SFRD measures the network resilience against node
degree-based attack.
Using an example, we illustrate how to measure network resilience of a 9-node wheel
topology via sums of flow robustness against betweenness attack (SFRB). To compute
the sums of flow robustness, we need to remove all nodes in this graph iteratively. In
each iteration, one node is removed and the flow robustness is computed and added to
the previous sum of flow robustness values. The permutation of the nodes list defines all
possible ways for node attacks. In this example, we attack nodes based on their highest
betweenness values, which yields the list {0, 1, 5, 3, 7, 8, 2, 4, 6}. Figure 3.4 depicts the
topology while the attack is undergoing. Light green colored nodes indicate connected
status (not attacked) while dark red nodes indicate disconnected status (attacked). Once
a node is attacked all links attached to that node are removed. The values of robustness
for reach iteration are shown in the Table 3.8. In step 2, we observe that after removing
node 0, all 8 links are removed but flow robustness decreased by 0.22, which is not
significant since there are alternative paths for the other nodes to communicate. However,
in step 4, the flow robustness is decreased by 0.58 − 0.17 = 0.41, which is the largest
flow robustness decrease because the graph is partitioned into two components. Notice
that we stop after step 6 since there are no remaining links. The sum of flow robustness
values for a 9-node wheel topology is 2.61 as shown in the Table 3.8.
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Figure 3.4: Measuring SFRB a 9-node wheel topology
Table 3.8: Measuring SFRB of a 9-node wheel topology
Step Removed Nodes FR SFRB
1 {} 1.00 1.00
2 {0} 0.78 1.78
3 {0, 1} 0.58 2.36
4 {0, 1, 5} 0.17 2.53
5 {0, 1, 5, 3} 0.08 2.61
6 {0, 1, 5, 3, 7} 0.00 2.61
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our dataset, which includes baseline graphs, random graphs,
and real-world graphs. Then, we introduced our graph robustness metrics and how they
capture balanced-centrality of a given graph. Next, we presented our weighted flow ro-
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bustness and showed how it is used to capture network resilience. We also introduced
several centrality-based attack models and how they are used to measure network re-
silience. In addition, we discussed how our model converts unweighted graphs to weighted
graphs using node populations and link betweenness. Finally, we present how we use flow
robustness to measure network resilience against centrality attacks.
50
Chapter 4
Network Design and Improvement
In this chapter, we present our algorithms to improve a given graph based on a given
objective function. We present four algorithms to improve algebraic connectivity, path
diversity, balancing centrality, and a comprehensive comparison algorithm. The algebraic
connectivity improvement algorithm is presented in Section 4.1. The work on improving
algebraic connectivity has resulted in a publication [67]. The path diversity improvement
algorithm is presented in Section 4.2, which has also resulted in a publication [108]. The
balancing centrality improvement algorithm is introduced in 4.3,which has resulted in a
publication [107]. The comprehensive comparison algorithm is presented in Section 4.4.
4.1 Algebraic Connectivity Improvement
Based on the greedy approach presented in Section 2.1.3, we develop an algorithm that
improves the connectivity of a graph in terms of the algebraic connectivity metric by
adding a set of links. Algebraic connectivity a(G) is defined and discussed in Section 2.2.3.
The main objective of our algorithm is to select the links that improve the algebraic
connectivity of the graph in the least costly manner. Moreover, we introduce a cost-effect
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parameter γ to our improvement algorithm to control the effect of algebraic connectivity
and cost while selecting new links.
The greedy algorithm to increase algebraic connectivity in a graph is based on adding
links to the nodes that have the least incident links (i.e. minimal degree nodes) [33, 35].
Our algorithm provides cost-efficient new links to improve network resilience measured
by the algebraic connectivity metric. The assumptions, objective functions, and our
heuristic algorithm is presented in Section 4.1.1. The evaluation of our algorithm on a
sample graph is presented in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Algebraic Connectivity Improvement Algorithm
In this section, we describe our algorithm that improves the algebraic connectivity and
cost of a topology. Furthermore, we assume that node geolocations are given for a
particular graph to which the improvement algorithm is applied, as would be the case
for a deployed service provider.
Algorithm
The greedy improvement algorithm has three inputs: an input graph Gi, a number of
required links L, and a cost-effect parameter γ. The input graph Gi has a number of
nodes ni with a number of links li. The number of required links L is the number of
links that will be added to the graph. The cost-effect parameter γ is a tuning parameter
between cost and algebraic connectivity. When γ = 0, the cost term of the rank function,
shown in Equation 4.1, is neglected since it is zero. As a result, the algorithm selects
the link that maximizes the algebraic connectivity. On the other hand, when γ = 1, the
algebraic connectivity is neglected and the least link cost is selected in each iteration.
The algorithm adds links to the graph with L iterations. To keep track of the selected
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links in each iteration, the algorithm adds these links to a list. In each iteration, the
algorithm starts by adding the selected links from previous iterations to the graph. Then,
the rank value is computed for each candidate link and the link with the maximum rank
value to be added is selected. A ranking function is used to select the best candidate in
each iteration. The rank value r is computed using:
r = (1− γ)a(G) + γ(1− C) (4.1)
where C represents the length of the ranked link.
The pseudocode of our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. This algorithm uses four
functions: cost function cost(L), algebraic connectivity function algConn(G), link rank-
ing function maxLink(D), and candidate link function candidate(G). The cost function
cost(L) returns the cost of adding a link L. In this research, the cost is defined as the
Euclidean distance between the two ends of the link. The algebraic connectivity function
algConn(G) takes a graph G and returns the second smallest eigenvalue of its Laplacian
matrix. The maxLink(D) function returns the maximum ranked link. The candidate(G)
takes a graph G as input and returns a set of candidate links to be added to the graph.
The candidate links are a set of links that are examined every time a link is added to
a graph. One option to use for the candidate links is the set of complement links of a
graph denoted as Ḡ, which can be determined as the set of links in full mesh subtracted
from the current links in a graph G. The number of complement links is computed as:
ni(ni − 1)
2
− li (4.2)
However, this number is computationally expensive as the number of nodes ni gets larger,
which results in a complexity of O(Ln2i ). In an attempt to decrease the number of
candidate links, we only examine the links connected to the lowest degree node in the
graph. As a result, the algorithm complexity decreases to O(Lni).
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Functions:
cost(L) := cost function
algConn(G) := algebraic connectivity function
candidate(G) := candidate links function
maxLink(D) := max value of a dictionary
Input:
Gi := input graph
L := number of required links
γ := cost effect parameter
Output:
an ordered list of the added links
begin
selectedLinks = []; empty ordered list
rank = {}; empty dictionary
while L > 0 do
G = Gi
G.addlinks(AddedLinks)
for link in candidate(G) do
rank[link]=(1− γ)algConn(G) + γ(1−cost(link))
end
selectedLinks.add(maxLink(rank))
L = L− 1
end
return selectedLinks
end
Algorithm 1: Algebraic connectivity Improvement algorithm
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Both the algConn(G) and cost(L) functions are normalized to have a maximum value of
one. Since the theoretical maximum value for the algebraic connectivity of a given graph
is the number of its nodes, it is normalized by dividing it by the number of nodes. To
normalize the cost function, it is divided by the maximum possible distance between any
nodes in the graph.
4.1.2 a(G) Improvement Algorithm Example
In this section, we explain how our greedy algorithm improves a topology on a small-size
graph. Figure 4.1 shows a sample graph with 8 nodes and 9 links as solid lines. The
initial algebraic connectivity of this sample graph is 0.3432 and the initial cost (i.e. total
link length in km) of the graph is 8,203. Our greedy algorithm adds links to the least
connected nodes, which in the example are nodes 0 and 7. The six candidate links for
node 0 are shown as square dots, whereas five candidate links for node 7 are shown as
long dashes and dots. Throughout this example, we describe how our algorithm operates
if we are going to add one link L = 1 to the sample graph shown in Figure 4.1.
7
6
4
5
1
3 2
0
Figure 4.1: Graph example for algebraic connectivity based improvement
There can be a maximum of 28 links in this 8-node graph (the maximum number of
links can be calculated by n(n−1)
2
). Since there are 9 links in the graph, if we were to
examine all links in the complement set, there would be 28− 9 = 19 candidate links. In
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the sample graph shown in Figure 4.1, there are six candidate links that can be added
to node 0 and there are five links for node 7 using our greedy algorithm. Therefore, the
candidate link set is reduced to 11, because our algorithm only considers candidate links
from the least connected nodes. The algebraic connectivity and cost value of adding each
link individually for γ = 0 and γ = 1 is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: a(G) and cost values for the example graph
Link
γ = 0 γ = 1
a(G) ∆a(G) cost ∆ cost
0 ↔ 2 0.3485 0.0053 9,275 1,072
0 ↔ 3 0.3588 0.0156 9,405 1,202
0 ↔ 4 0.3659 0.0227 9,848 1,645
0 ↔ 5 0.4079 0.0647 10,624 2,421
0 ↔ 6 0.5908 0.2476 11,228 3,025
0 ↔ 7 0.7713 0.4281 11,843 3,640
7 ↔ 1 0.8345 0.4913 11,302 3,099
7 ↔ 2 0.7071 0.3639 12,061 3,858
7 ↔ 3 0.6651 0.3219 10,915 2,712
7 ↔ 4 0.5918 0.2486 10,207 2,004
7 ↔ 5 0.5075 0.1643 9,463 1,260
When γ = 0, our algorithm ignores the cost associated with adding a link and selects
the additional link that increases the algebraic connectivity of the graph the most. For
γ = 0, the algorithm adds the link between node 1 and 7 in the example graph since it
provides the highest algebraic connectivity among the 11 candidate links. When γ = 1,
the cost is the dominant factor determining the addition of a link. Therefore, our heuristic
algorithm selects the link between node 0 and 2, since it incurs the lowest cost among the
candidate set of links. The selection of links via our heuristic algorithm is highlighted in
bold in Table 4.1.
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4.2 Path Diversity Improvement
In this section, we first develop an algorithm to calculate the TGD (described in Sec-
tion 2.2.4) of a graph [11,32]. We modify the TGD calculation algorithm so that instead
of considering relatively more diverse paths [11,32], we consider the effect of the diversity
of all paths when calculating the TGD. Second, we introduce an algorithm for finding
the optimal k-diverse paths considering both nodes and links using an exhaustive path
search. Lastly, we present an improvement algorithm that improves the path diversity of
a graph based on the TGD metric. Our graph improvement algorithm considers adding
links with the least cost among available choices.
The rest of the section is organized as follows: The algorithm to calculate the path
diversity of a graph is explained in Section 4.2.1. The assumptions, objective functions,
and our heuristic algorithm is presented in Section 4.2.2. The evaluation of our algorithm
on a sample graph is presented in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Finding k-Diverse Paths
In this section, we present a new k-diverse paths algorithm that determines the k paths
between a source s and destination d. This algorithm has four inputs: a source node s, a
destination node d, a hop-count threshold h, and a threshold for the number of returned
diverse paths k. Moreover, this algorithm uses four functions: all simple paths(s,d,h),
sort(L), path2elements(P ), and p div(P ). The all simple paths(s,d,h) function finds all
possible loopless paths between source s and destination d, with hop-count threshold h
for the path length. If h is not set, all possible paths are returned. Whereas selecting
higher h value yields more accurate results, it requires more computing resources. The
number of all possible simple paths can be as large as n!, where n is the number of nodes.
This number is infeasible to compute for large size graphs, thus, the h parameter should
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be chosen based on the size of the graph and available computing resources. The sort(L)
function sorts a list of tuples of three elements: link, diversity, and cost. The sorting is
done in decreasing order of the diversity value and increasing order of the cost value for
links with equal diversities. The path2elements(P ) function converts a path P to a set
of nodes and links elements. The p div(P ) function computes the diversity of the path
with respect to the selected elements set. The pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 2.
Functions:
all simple paths(s,d,h) := all simple paths between node s and node d with a
threshold hop-count h
sort(l) := sorting l function
path2elements(P ) := path P to link and node elements
p div(P ) := computes path diversity of path P
Input:
s := source node
d := destination node
h := hop-count threshold value for examined paths
k := threshold value for returned diverse paths
Output:
an ordered list of kdiverse paths
begin
diverse paths = []; empty ordered list
selected elements = {}; empty set
for path in all simple paths(s,d,h) do
diverse paths.append(path,p div(path),len(path))
selected elements.add(path2elements(path))
end
sort(diverse paths)
return diverse paths[0:k]
end
Algorithm 2: k-diverse path algorithm
This algorithm has two phases: finding all simple paths and finding the most diverse
k paths. In the first phase, all possible paths are determined between a source s and
destination d with a hop-count threshold h using the function all simple paths(s,d,h). For
the second phase, the algorithm determines the most diverse paths among the returned
paths via the all simple paths function. The shortest path P0 is added to the selected paths
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in the first iteration and its elements (nodes and links) are added to the selected elements
set. Next, the algorithm iterates over the remaining paths by computing the diversity
of the path using the p div(P ) function and adding it along with the path length to the
diverse paths list while the path elements are added to the selected elements. Finally,
using the sort(L) function, all the tuples in the diverse paths list are sorted in decreasing
order of their diversity. In case there are multiple paths with the same diversity, these
paths are sorted in increasing order of their hop-count.
4.2.2 Path Diversity Improvement Algorithm
In this section, we describe our algorithm that improves the TGD of a given graph with its
node locations by adding new cost-efficient links. Our heuristic algorithm is implemented
using Python and uses the NetworkX library [109] for graph algorithms. The objective
of this algorithm is to improve the TGD of a graph by adding a user-specified number
of links. The algorithm adds one link that increases the TGD the most. If there are
multiple links that give the same largest TGD value, the least costly link is selected.
We measure the cost of a link in terms of the Euclidian distance of that link. The link
addition process is repeated until the number of links requested by the user is added.
Algorithm
The objective of this algorithm is to improve the TGD of a graph by adding a user-
specified number of links. The algorithm adds one link that maximizes the TGD value.
If there are multiple links that give the same largest TGD value, the least costly link is
selected. We measure the cost of a link in terms of the Euclidean distance of that link.
The topology improvement algorithm has two inputs: an input graph Gi, a number of
required links Lr. The input graph Gi has a number of nodes ni with a number of links
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li. The number of required links Lr is the number of links that should be added to the
graph. The algorithm adds links to the graph with Lr iterations. To keep track of the
selected links in each iteration, the algorithm adds this link to the selectedLinks list. In
each iteration, the algorithm starts by adding the selected links from previous iterations
to the graph.
The candidate set contains the links that are connected to the pairs with the lowest
EPD values of the graph and not currently present in the graph. To find the best
candidate link, each link in the candidate set is added to the graph and the EPD of the
corresponding pair is computed and mapped to that link. Then, the link with the largest
EPD is selected. In case there are multiple links with the same largest EPD, the least
costly link is selected. This process is repeated until the user requested number of links
are added.
This algorithm uses four functions: cost(l), epd(P ), candidate(G), and bestLink(L). The
cost function cost(l) returns the cost of adding a link l. In this research, the cost is
defined as the Euclidean distance between the two ends of the link. The effective path
diversity function epd(P ) computes the effective path diversity of the path P based on
Equation 2.22. The bestLink(L) function returns the link with the highest EPD and
lowest cost in case of multiple highest EPD values. The candidate(G) takes a graph G as
input and returns a set of candidate tuples of two elements. The first element is a lowest
EPD pair and the second element is a candidate link. The candidate links are the set of
all links in which one end is connected to a node in the lowest EPD pair and the other
end is connected to a node in the graph given that this link does not exist in the graph.
For each pair and link in the candidate set, we add the link to the graph and compute
the new EPD value of that pair with its cost. Finally, the link with the highest EPD and
the lowest cost is selected using bestLink(L) function and then added to the selectedLinks
list. The pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 3.
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Functions:
cost(l) := cost of link l
epd(P ) := EPD value of path P
candidate(G) := candidate links function
bestLink(L) := maximum EPD value of links list L
Input:
Gi := input graph
Lr := number of required links
Output:
an ordered list of the added links
begin
selectedLinks = []; empty ordered list
links epd list = []; empty ordered list
while Lr > 0 do
G = Gi
G.addlinks(selectedLinks)
for P, L in candidate(G) do
links epd list.append((L,epd(P ),cost(L)))
end
selectedLinks.add(bestLink(links epd list))
Lr = Lr − 1
end
return selectedLinks
end
Algorithm 3: Topology improvement algorithm
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4.2.3 Path Diversity Improvement Algorithm Example
In this section, we explain how our heuristic algorithm improves a topology on a small-
size graph. Figure 4.2 shows a sample graph with 5 nodes and 5 links. In this example,
the hop count threshold h is set to 10 and the number of diverse paths k is set to 4. The
initial TGD value of this sample graph is 0.2023. Our heuristic algorithm examines the
links connected to the least EPD pairs. The smallest EPD pairs are (1,2) and (3,4) with
EPD of 0 since they have no alternative paths. Therefore, the candidate set consists of
four possible links for each pair.
4 
3 
1 
2 
0 
0: Los Angeles, LA 
1: Houston, TX 
2: Kansas City, MO 
3: Chicago, IL 
4: Boston, MA 
Figure 4.2: Graph example for path diversity based improvement
To find the best candidate, we determine the resulting EPD of the corresponding pair
after adding the candidate link and the cost incurred as shown in Table 4.2. Then, we
find the link that gives the highest pair EPD. Among the eight candidates, there are four
links that give a high pair EPD of 0.50. The next step is to find the lowest length link,
which is the link (1,3). After adding this link, the new TGD of this graph is 0.4034,
which is almost double the initial TGD.
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Table 4.2: EPD and cost values for the candidate links in the example graph
Node Pair Link Pair EPD Cost
(1, 2) (1, 0) 0.50 2,177
(1, 2) (1, 3) 0.50 1,043
(1, 2) (1, 4) 0.46 2,311
(1, 2) (2, 4) 0.00 1,988
(3, 4) (3, 1) 0.00 1,043
(3, 4) (4, 0) 0.50 4,058
(3, 4) (4, 1) 0.46 2,311
(3, 4) (4, 2) 0.50 1,988
4.3 Balancing Centrality Improvement
In this section, we describe our algorithm that balance the centrality of a given graph
based on a given centrality function. The centrality functions used in this research are
node betweenness, node closeness, and node degree. The objective of this algorithm is
to balance the centrality by minimizing the centrality variance across all the nodes of a
given graph via adding a number of links constrained by a cost budget. To achieve that,
our algorithm minimizes the variance of the nodes’ centralities measured by one of three
node centrality functions: node betweenness, node closeness, and node degree. If there
are multiple links that yield the same minimum variance value, the lowest cost link is
selected. Moreover, if there are multiple links with the same cost, the link with a lower
index is selected. We measure the cost of a link in terms of the Euclidean length of that
link. The link addition process is repeated until one of two conditions is met. First, if
there is no link that can be added without exceeding the budget, the algorithm stops
because the budget constraint is met at this point. Second, whenever all candidate links
are added, the algorithm stops because there are no more links to be added to the graph.
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4.3.1 Balancing Centrality Improvement Algorithm
The objective of this algorithm is to balance graph centrality among all the nodes of
a given graph by adding a set of links constrained by a cost budget. To achieve this
objective, our algorithm minimizes the variance of the node centralities measured by
one of the three node centrality functions: node betweenness, node closeness, and node
degree. If there are multiple links that yield the same minimum variance value, the lowest
cost link is selected. The pseudocode of our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
There are two inputs for this algorithm: an input graph G and a budget constraint B.
The input graph G has a number of nodes n with a number of links l and the node
positions. The budget constraint B is measured in meters to specify the allowed total
length for link addition. The algorithm adds links to the graph iteratively. To keep track
of the selected links in each iteration, the algorithm adds these links to the selectedLinks
list. Moreover, to keep track of the selected links cost, the algorithm increments the
totalCost by the cost of each added link. For the candidate set, all possible candidate
links are in the graph’s complement. However, this set may contain very long links
that are not practical to be added to a physical graph. Thus, the candidate links are
constrained by the longest link in the input graph as discussed in Section 3.1.5.
There are seven functions used by this algorithm. The cost function cost(l) returns the
cost of adding a link l that is defined as the Euclidean distance between the two ends
of the link. The function nBtwn(G) computes the node betweenness of all the nodes in
graph G. The function nClos(G) computes the closeness for every node in graph G. The
function nDeg(G) computes the number of links connected to every node in graph G. The
bestLink(L) function returns the best candidate link given that it is an affordable link
and it has the minimum-variance value and lowest cost in case of multiple tie minimum-
variance values. The var(L) function returns the variance of the values in list L. The
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Functions:
cost(l) := cost of link l
nBtwn(G) := betweenness for all nodes in graph G
nClos(G) := closeness for all nodes in graph G
nDeg(G) := degree for all nodes in graph G
candidate(G) := candidate links function
var(L) := computes variance of list L
bestLink(L) := affordable low variance in list L
Input:
G := input graph
B := available budget
Output:
selectedLinks := an ordered list of the selected links
begin
centralityFunc = nBtwn | nClos | nDeg
selectedLinks = [] ; empty ordered list
varAndCost = [] ; empty ordered list
totalCost = 0; initial total cost is zero
while B >= totalCost ∧
selectedLinks 6= candidate(G) do
G.addlinks(selectedLinks)
for l in candidate(G) do
centralityVar = var(centralityFunc(G)) varAndCost.append((l,
centralityVar, cost(l)))
end
selectedLink = bestLink(varAndCost)
selectedLinks.add(selectedLink)
totalCost += cost(selectedLink)
end
return selectedLinks
end
Algorithm 4: Balancing centrality algorithm
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candidate(G) function returns candidate links in graph G.
The centrality function centralityFunc is selected from the three options: nBtwn, nClos,
and nDeg. For each link in the candidate set, the algorithm temporarily adds the link
to the graph and computes the variance value and the cost incurred by that link, which
are added to the varAndCost list. After that, the temporary link is removed and the
next candidate link is added to undergo the same process. The link with the minimum
variance and the lowest cost is selected using the bestLink function and then it is added to
the selectedLinks list. Inside the bestLink function, if the minimum variance link cost plus
the total cost exceeds the budget, a next minimum link is examined until a link with
affordable cost is found. This process is repeated until no link can be added without
exceeding the given budget or there are no more available links in the candidate set.
4.3.2 Balancing Centrality Algorithm Example
In this section, we explain how our heuristic algorithm improves a topology on a small-
size graph. Figure 4.3 shows a sample graph connecting major U.S. cities with 7 nodes
and 7 links. In this example, we apply our algorithm to add a single link using three
objective functions one at a time. In this example, we add a maximum length constraint
for the links located in the candidate set as discussed in Section 3.1.5.
The objective functions are minimizing the betweenness variance of the sample graph
nodes, minimizing the closeness variance of the sample graph nodes, and minimizing the
degree variance of the sample graph nodes. To find the best candidate, the algorithm finds
the candidate set, which contains the links of the complement graph that are not longer
than the current maximum link in the graph. The number of links in the complement
graph is 7×6
2
− 7 = 14 links. In this example, the longest link of the input graph is
between nodes 5 and 6 that has a length of 2,177 km. Therefore, 8 links that have a
66
4 
2 
5 
0: Seattle, WA 
1: Denver, CO 
2: Kansas City, MO 
3: Chicago, IL 
4: Boston, MA 
5: Los Angeles, LA 
6: Houston, TX 
0 
1 
3 
6 
Figure 4.3: Improvement graph example
length greater than this value are removed from the candidate link set and 6 links remain
in the candidate set. For each candidate link, the algorithm determines the centrality
variance across all nodes after adding the candidate link and the cost incurred as shown
in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Centrality variance and cost for candidate links
Candidate Betweenness Closeness Degree
Cost [m]
links variance variance variance
(1, 3) 0.0125 0.0085 0.4897 1,453,452
(1, 5) 0.0374 0.0086 0.4897 1,259,832
(1, 6) 0.0323 0.0099 0.4897 1,070,221
(2, 4) 0.0379 0.0076 0.4897 1,988,059
(2, 5) 0.0459 0.0115 0.7755 2,143,391
(3, 6) 0.0125 0.0085 0.4897 1,043,873
According to our algorithm, the link resulting in the minimum variance is selected. For
example, using closeness variance as an objective function, the link (2,4) is selected be-
cause it gives the minimum variance value of 0.0076. In case there are multiple minimum
values, the link with the least cost is selected among those minimum variance links. For
example, using betweenness variance as an objective function, there are two links with
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the minimum value of 0.0125, namely links (1,3) and (3,6). Next, the algorithm finds the
link with the minimum cost, which is (3,6) in this example.
4.4 Comprehensive Comparison
In this section, we present a generic greedy algorithm to improve a given graph robustness
by adding a set of links to maximize a given graph robustness metric. The objective of
this algorithm is to improve a given graph robustness metric by adding a specific set of
links while using a lower cost of links as a tie breaker. The output of this algorithm
is an improved graph for a given robustness metric . By applying this algorithm to all
robustness metrics with a constant number of links, we obtain improved graphs based on
each robustness function. We study and compare the network resilience of the yielded
improved graphs against targeted attacks.
4.4.1 Algorithm
We use a greedy approach to construct our algorithm, which adds a set of links Li to a
given graph Gi. The main objective of this algorithm is to determine a set of links of
size Li to maximize or minimize a given robustness metric. The algorithm adds the links
iteratively by selecting the link that satisfies the objective function such as maximizing
algebraic connectivity or minimizing the network criticality. The pseudocode of our
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.
Our improvement algorithm uses four functions: robustness(G), cost(l), candidate(G),
and bestLink(L). The robustness(G) function returns the robustness of a given graph G.
This function is selected as one of the robustness functions such as algebraic connectivity
and network criticality. The cost function cost(l) returns the cost of adding a link l that
is defined as the Euclidean distance between the two ends of the link. The candidate(G)
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Functions:
robustness(G) := objective robustness function
cost(l):= cost of link l
candidate(G) := candidate links function
bestLink(L) := highest improvement link in list L
Input:
Gi := input graph
Li := number of required links
Output:
selectedLinks := an ordered list of the selected links
begin
selectedLinks = [] ; empty ordered list
while Li > selectedLinks.length() do
G.addlinks(selectedLinks)
iterationList = []
for l in candidate(G) do
improvement = robustness(G) iterationList.append((l,
improvement,cost(l)))
end
selectedLink = bestLink(iterationList)
selectedLinks.add(selectedLink)
end
return selectedLinks
end
Algorithm 5: Comprehensive comparison improvement algorithm
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function returns a set of the candidate links, from which the subset of length Li is selected.
The bestLink(L) function returns the link with the highest improvement value while a low
cost link is considered as a tie breaker to obtain cost-efficient results. For determining the
candidate set using the candidate(G) function, all possible candidate links are located in
the input graph complement constrained by the longest link as discussed in Section 3.1.5.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented four improvement algorithms to improve network resilience
against targeted attacks. First, the algebraic connectivity improvement algorithm was
presented to add links to improve maximize algebraic connectivity, which improves the
resilience against graph partitioning. In addition, the path diversity improvement algo-
rithm was presented to improve network path diversity in terms of increasing the number
of disjoint paths. Third, the balancing centrality improvement algorithm was introduced
to add links to balance a given graph centrality such as degree, closeness, and between-
ness. Finally, the comprehensive comparison algorithm was presented to add links to a
given graph via a specified robustness function.
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Chapter 5
Network Resilience Evaluation
In this chapter, we present our evaluation of the graph robustness metrics discussed in
Section 2.2. In Section 5.1, we start by studying the execution time for these graph ro-
bustness metrics as the number of nodes increases and provide the results. In Section 5.2,
we present our evaluation results of applying our algebraic connectivity improvement al-
gorithm. In Section 5.3, we present our evaluation results of applying our path diversity
improvement algorithm. In Section 5.4 shows the evaluation results of our balancing
centrality algorithm. In Section 5.5, we present our accuracy and improvement evalu-
ation of the spectral robustness graph metrics. Moreover, we conduct a comprehensive
comparison of all robustness graph-metrics to measure their accuracy in predicating net-
work resilience against centrality-based attacks in Section 5.7. Finally, we study non-
and improved graphs for all metrics and evaluate their network resilience against such
attacks in Section 5.8.
5.1 Graph Metrics Time Complexity
In this section, we study the execution time for the graph robustness metrics presented
in Section 2.2. Graph-robustness metric algorithmic complexity generally depends on
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Table 5.1: Graph metrics execution time in seconds
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
C̄D 2.57e-5 2.93e-5 3.46e-5 3.86e-5 4.29e-5 4.88e-5 5.10e-5 5.77e-5 6.47e-5 6.71e-5
σ2CD 8.02e-5 8.39e-5 9.07e-5 9.52e-5 1.01e-4 1.08e-4 1.09e-4 1.16e-4 1.23e-4 1.27e-4
σ2CC 2.65e-4 7.27e-4 1.50e-3 2.64e-3 4.09e-3 6.13e-3 8.27e-3 1.15e-2 1.55e-2 1.97e-2
σ2CBv
5.17e-4 1.82e-3 4.59e-3 8.85e-3 1.50e-2 2.32e-2 3.38e-2 4.74e-2 6.66e-2 8.74e-2
σ2CBl
5.89e-4 2.20e-3 5.60e-3 1.07e-2 1.82e-2 2.85e-2 4.16e-2 5.95e-2 8.32e-2 1.09e-1
CC 9.52e-5 3.15e-4 7.19e-4 1.39e-3 2.25e-3 3.83e-3 5.60e-3 8.53e-3 1.17e-2 1.52e-2
As 4.33e-4 6.86e-4 1.04e-3 1.46e-3 2.02e-3 2.64e-3 3.45e-3 4.29e-3 5.25e-3 6.27e-3
R 1.82e-4 6.31e-4 1.38e-3 2.52e-3 3.96e-3 6.01e-3 8.18e-3 1.14e-2 1.51e-2 1.96e-2
D 1.81e-4 6.31e-4 1.38e-3 2.51e-3 3.96e-3 6.01e-3 8.21e-3 1.15e-2 1.52e-2 1.97e-2
d̄ 1.89e-4 6.21e-4 1.37e-3 2.47e-3 3.86e-3 5.64e-3 7.97e-3 1.10e-2 1.48e-2 1.92e-2
TGD 1.85e-2 1.3200 9.5300 3.87e1 1.04e2 2.36e2 4.57e2 8.55e2 1.42e3 2.18e3
λ2 1.09e-3 1.20e-3 1.37e-3 1.62e-3 1.92e-3 2.26e-3 2.72e-3 3.42e-3 4.69e-3 5.46e-3
∆λ 5.54e-4 8.15e-4 1.17e-3 1.63e-3 2.31e-3 3.11e-3 4.19e-3 5.49e-3 7.01e-3 8.78e-3
τ̂ 1.22e-3 1.53e-3 1.97e-3 2.63e-3 3.55e-3 5.06e-3 7.42e-3 7.42e-3 9.43e-3 1.30e-2
WS 1.81e-3 1.94e-3 2.15e-3 2.43e-3 2.80e-3 3.19e-3 3.72e-3 4.47e-3 5.10e-3 6.49e-3
λ̄ 5.57e-4 8.17e-4 1.19e-3 1.67e-3 2.29e-3 3.13e-3 4.44e-3 5.55e-3 7.15e-3 8.90e-3
C∗ 1.09e-3 1.22e-3 1.42e-3 1.67e-3 1.98e-3 2.36e-3 2.88e-3 3.56e-3 4.20e-3 4.89e-3
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Figure 5.1: Execution time for computing centrality-balanced graph metrics
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Figure 5.2: Execution time for computing spectral graph metrics
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Figure 5.3: Execution time for computing uncategorized graph metrics
graph order (number of nodes) as discussed in Section 2.2. Several computer network
design and improvement approaches require a low execution time, particularly when
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dealing with dynamic network infrastructure. Hence, we study the execution time for
each robustness metric as the number of nodes increases. All graph metric robustness
function implementations are from the Python NetworkX library [109]. The number
of nodes are between 10 and 100 with an increment of 10 nodes. The execution time is
measured in seconds and the average results of 20 samples for all graph metrics are shown
in Table 5.1. Moreover, we plot our results as a function of graph order to show how
the execution time behaves as number of the nodes increases. To present our plots more
clearly, we divide graph robustness metrics into three categories: centrality-balanced,
spectral, and uncategorized.
The execution time for computing centrality-balanced graph metrics is shown in Fig-
ure 5.1. For these graph metrics, execution time takes from 10−5 to 1 second as shown
in Figure 5.1. However, we observe that the variances of link and node betweenness
requires more time than the average degree, the variances of node degree, and clustering
coëficcient as graph order increases. The execution time for computing spectral graph
metrics is shown in Figure 5.2. Among the three categories, spectral graph metrics show
the fastest execution time with less than 200 ms as the graph order reaches 100 nodes.
The execution time for computing uncategorized graph metrics is shown in Figure 5.3.
The total graph diversity (TGD) is the most expensive graph robustness metric as it
exceeds 1000 s as the as the graph order reaches 100 nodes.
5.2 Improvement Algebraic Connectivity
In this section, we apply our algebraic connectivity algorithm, presented in Section 4.1.1,
on the dataset presented in Section 3.1 First, we study and analyze the impact of the
algorithm on algebraic connectivity and cost. Then, we evaluate this algorithm by apply-
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ing a set of centrality-based attacks on the non- and improved graphs to examine their
resilience via flow robustness values.
5.2.1 Improvement Analysis
Our algorithm is applied to five service providers by adding 100 links. We show the graph
algebraic connectivity and the cost incurred in terms of meters after adding each link.
Moreover, we show the relation of cost and algebraic connectivity, and the slope in these
figures indicates how the cost increases as the graph connectivity improves.
Selection of γ values
The value of γ parameter ranges 0 to 1 and controls the outcome of the algorithm as
described in Section 4.1.1. In Equation 4.1, we have two terms: (1−γ)a(G) and γ(1−C).
The a(G) is a normalized algebraic connectivity value, which is low for sparse graphs and
a value of one for a full mesh graph. The value of C denotes the normalized cost of
adding a link and it is low when the maximum possible link length in the input graph is
larger than the average link length in the candidate set. Therefore, choosing the value
of γ depends on the initial properties of the input graph. For the five graphs presented
in Table 3.1.3, we choose for γ = {0, 10−9, 10−7, 10−5, 1} because the cost term is larger
than the γ term by about six degrees of magnitude.
Physical-level topology analysis
We have added a link length constraint to our heuristic algorithm to discard the links
that are longer than the actual maximum link of the graph. Algebraic connectivity
improvement of the Sprint physical level topology after adding 100 links iteratively is
depicted in Figure 5.4. The algebraic connectivity is higher for γ = 0 than the other
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values of γ, and for γ = 1 our algorithm considers minimizing the cost, but not improving
the algebraic connectivity. We observe a possible phase transition occurs when γ = 1 for
the physical-level graphs. For example, algebraic connectivity improvement of the Sprint
physical topology starts with a moderate increase, and after the 20th link addition, the
improvement (i.e. the slope of the curve) gets steeper. The reasons for the occurrence of
this phenomenon will be the subject of future work.
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Figure 5.4: Connectivity improvement for Sprint physical topology
The cost incurred when adding 100 links iteratively to the Sprint physical level topology
is shown in Figure 5.5. The cost in physical topology is the length of links to be laid
between nodes, thus, short links are favorable in physical level topology improvement for
γ = 1.
The relationship between connectivity and cost for the Sprint physical level topology
is shown in Figure 5.6. For the Sprint example shown in Figure 5.6, if the cost is the
constraint (i.e. γ = 1), the designer can improve the algebraic connectivity to 0.006 by
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Figure 5.5: Cost incurred with adding links for Sprint physical topology
adding 100 links. On the other hand, if cost is not considered (i.e. γ = 0) the algebraic
connectivity of the Sprint topology can be improved to more than 0.035.
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Figure 5.6: Connectivity and cost trade-offs for Sprint physical topology
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Here, we have presented and analyzed Sprint physical topology in terms of algebraic
connectivity improvement and incurred cost. In addition to the Sprint physical topol-
ogy improvement plots, both AT&T and Level 3 physical topologies are presented in
Appendix B.1.1.
5.2.2 Robustness Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of applying the graph centrality attacks to non- and
improved graphs by removing 50 nodes from each graph. From the improved graphs, we
select the graphs generated using γ = {0, 10−7, 1} since they represent the lowest, middle,
and highest γ values. The improved graphs when γ = 0 are expected to be the most
resilient since new links are selected purely to improve algebraic connectivity with no
cost consideration. The improved graphs when γ = 10−7 are expected to be the second
most resilient graphs since new links are selected to improve algebraic connectivity while
favoring the least cost links with a threshold related to 10−7. The improved graphs when
γ = 1 are expected to be the least resilient graphs since the new links are selected to
purely minimize the total cost.
The node betweenness attack is consistently the most destructive, since flow robustness
decreases faster than the other two centrality attacks as shown in Figures 5.7, B.19, B.22,
B.25, and B.28. The second most destructive centrality attack among the three is
the closeness attack since it shows a higher impact on the flow robustness. The least
destructive attack is the degree attack as it yields the lowest impact on flow robustness.
Table 5.2 shows the sum of flow robustness values, which represent the area under the
flow robustness curve after 50 nodes are removed. The a(G)-improved graphs are more
resilient than non-improved graphs because they have 100 additional links.
For AT&T non- and improved graphs, the results of applying three centrality attacks
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Figure 5.7: AT&T betweenness-based attack
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Figure 5.8: AT&T closeness-based attack
are shown in Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9. For the betweenness attack on AT&T non- and
improved graphs, we observe that the a(G)-improved graph when γ = 0 has the highest
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Figure 5.9: AT&T degree-based attack
sum of flow robustness of 21.90 as shown in Table 5.2. Next, the a(G)-improved graph
when γ = 10−7 comes second in terms of flow robustness with an insignificant difference
of 21.14. Improved graphs when γ = 1 and non-improved graphs have the lowest flow
robustness values of 13.01 and 11.70 respectively. For the closeness attack, the a(G)-
improved graph when γ = 10−7 has the highest flow robustness value of 30.31 and the
second highest is when γ = 0 with a flow robustness sum of 27.32. Similar to betweenness
attack results, improved graphs when γ = 1 and non-improved graphs have the lowest
flow robustness values of 15.60 and 15.15 respectively. For the degree attack, the a(G)-
improved graph when γ = 0 has the highest flow robustness value of 41.34 and the second
highest is when γ = 10−7 with a flow robustness sum of 38.89. Similar to betweenness
attack results, improved graphs when γ = 1 and non-improved graphs have the lowest
flow robustness values of 15.60 and 15.15. Given the previous flow robustness for all the
attacks on AT&T non- and improved graphs, we see that a(G)-improved graph when
γ = 0 is more resilient than the other γ values. However, in some cases, the γ = 10−7
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yields very similar flow robustness results to the improved graphs using γ = 0. In these
cases, feasible graphs can be selected based on the available budget. For example, for
the betweenness attack on AT&T, the flow robustness sum difference between γ = 0
and γ = 10−7 is 21.90 − 21.14 = 0.76, which is insignificant. On the other hand, the
cost difference between the two is about 5.3× 107 − 4.0× 107 = 1.3× 107 m, which is a
significantly high cost. At this point, it depends on the user to decide if this additional
flow robustness is worth 1.3× 107 m or link cost.
Using the same method, we study the flow robustness values for the other providers’
non- and improved graphs for each centrality attack presented in Table 5.2. From these
results, we can see very clearly the same pattern in AT&T non- and improved graphs.
The graphs improved using γ = 0 are the most resilient to any centrality attacks for
the examined physical graphs. However, this is not always the case; we have four cases
where γ = 10−7 yields more flow robustness sums than γ = 0. The first case happens
in the AT&T graphs with closeness attack and the other three cases happen due to the
degree attack on the three providers: Sprint, Internet2, and CORONET. By looking at
the corresponding algebraic connectivity values for each case, we see that the algebraic
connectivity values are higher for γ = 0 even though γ = 10−7 have higher flow robustness
sums for these cases. However, for the other 11 cases the flow robustness sums are higher
for graphs with higher algebraic connectivity values.
We apply our algorithm, described in Section 4.1.1, to physical-level topologies of the
several backbone providers. The results showed trade-offs between improving algebraic
connectivity and minimizing cost, from which a cost-efficient set of link addition can
be chosen based on the value of γ. Moreover, we applied centrality-based attacks on
the non- and improved graphs and study their resilience in terms of flow robustness.
We showed that graphs with higher algebraic connectivities have mostly higher flow
robustness values, which means that they are more resilient. The complete set of plots
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Table 5.2: Algebraic connectivity improvement evaluation via flow robustness
Provider
Improvement Betweenness Closeness Degree
Method attack attack attack
AT&T
non-improved 11.70 15.15 25.66
a(G)-improved: γ = 0 21.90 27.32 41.34
a(G)-improved: γ = 10−7 21.14 30.31 38.89
a(G)-improved: γ = 1 13.01 15.60 35.55
Level 3
non-improved 5.68 7.15 7.30
a(G)-improved: γ = 0 13.81 16.58 23.32
a(G)-improved: γ = 10−7 10.96 12.22 21.33
a(G)-improved: γ = 1 7.96 10.61 21.05
Sprint
non-improved 8.46 11.10 14.31
a(G)-improved: γ = 0 14.50 20.64 29.39
a(G)-improved: γ = 10−7 13.87 16.38 31.68
a(G)-improved: γ = 1 10.41 15.10 26.75
Internet2
non-improved 4.09 5.00 4.71
a(G)-improved: γ = 0 8.98 10.20 15.47
a(G)-improved: γ = 10−7 8.74 9.23 15.94
a(G)-improved: γ = 1 8.12 8.37 13.84
CORONET
non-improved 7.43 7.84 9.87
a(G)-improved: γ = 0 10.82 17.23 18.60
a(G)-improved: γ = 10−7 10.39 14.38 18.61
a(G)-improved: γ = 1 8.70 10.62 19.60
for evaluating algebraic connectivity improvement for the five physical-level topologies is
presented in Appendix B.1.2.
5.3 Improvement of Path Diversity
In this section, we use CORONET [97, 98], Internet2 [95], and Level 3 [110] fiber-level
topologies presented in Section 3.1.3 for evaluating our path diversity improvement al-
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gorithm. We apply the improvement algorithm on three realistic backbone networks and
study the results. Then, we apply three centrality-based attacks to the resulting improved
and non-improved graphs and show how the robustness changes for each graph.
5.3.1 Improvement Analysis
We apply the improvement algorithm on three realistic backbone service provider graphs
and study the TGD improvement and the cost incurred for each graph as we add 20
links. We vary the value of path diversity k and hop-count h while λ is set to 0.5.
Varying the hop-count threshold h
The hop-count threshold h is a parameter that controls the length of the shortest path
returned by the k diverse algorithm introduced in Section 4.2.1. Therefore, to obtain the
optimal diverse paths, the value of h should be larger or equal to the diameter of the
graph in order to examine all possible paths in the graph. However, for large graphs,
large values of h may take an impractical time to calculate. Here, we apply the algorithm
with several values of hop count thresholds h = {5, 10, 15} while the value of k is set to
12. These values show how varying the parameter h affects the value of TGD.
Figure 5.10 depicts the results of each hop count threshold, which shows the TGD im-
provement as 20 links are added to the Internet2 topology. As the hop count threshold
increases, the size of the candidate set also increases, which in turn increases the proba-
bility of having a higher EPD value. As a result, a 5 hop-count threshold has the lowest
TGD while 10 and 15 have the median and highest TGD as shown in Figure 5.10.
As the hop-count threshold increases, the cost of adding links to Internet2 does not follow
the same pattern of TGD improvement. We observe that the 10 hop-count starts as the
lowest costly approach for the first 7 links while toward the end, the 15 hop-count becomes
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Figure 5.10: Internet2 TGD improvement
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Figure 5.11: Internet2 cost and TGD
as the lowest costly approach as shown in Figure 5.12. This indicates that changing the
hop-count parameter does not have direct affect on the incurred cost. Thus, the cost
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incurred depends on the initial topological properties such as the number of nodes and
links, average degree, and node locations. However, the cost needed to achieve a certain
TGD for Internet2 topology is shown in Figure 5.11, which shows that as the hop count
threshold increases, the cost to achieve a certain TGD in general decreases. We expect
this outcome to occur because a higher hop count threshold starts from a higher TGD
for the same reason mentioned earlier.
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Figure 5.12: Internet2 cost incurred
We have presented relevant plots to study the hop count impact for Internet2 physical-
level topology. The complete set of plots for evaluating algebraic connectivity improve-
ment for the other physical-level topologies is presented in Appendix B.2.1, which show
similar results to Internet2. Among the three networks, we observe that the cost needed
to achieve a certain TGD decreases as the hop count threshold increases.
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Varying the number of diverse paths k
The number of diverse paths k is a parameter that controls the number of the most diverse
paths returned by the k diverse algorithm introduced in Section 4.2.1. The value of k
depends on the application of the graph. For example, if the provider uses a multipath
routing protocol with a threshold for the number of multipaths used, k can be chosen to
match that parameter for accurate path diversity. Choosing a high value of k does not
have a processing complexity penalty similar to choosing a higher value of h.
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Figure 5.13: Internet2 TGD improvement
We apply the algorithm with several values of the number of diverse path threshold
k = {4, 8, 12} while the value of h is set to 15. As the value of k increases, the length
of diverse path set also increases, which in turn increases effective path diversity for a
given pair of nodes. Consequently, as the value of k increases, the corresponding TGD
increases as shown in Figure 5.13 for Internet2 topology. However, the length of the
diverse paths set is actually m, which does not increase as the maximum diversity of the
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remaining paths is zero as mentioned in Section 2.2.4. For this reason, the two k values
8 and 12 have similar outcomes as depicted in Figure 5.13. The cost incurred depends
on the initial topological properties as shown in Figure 5.14. The cost needed to achieve
a certain TGD for the Internet2 graph is shown in Figure 5.15, which shows that as the
value of k increases, the cost to achieve a certain TGD decreases as long as the increasing
the value of k actually increases the value of m.
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Figure 5.14: Internet2 cost incurred
We have presented relevant plots to study the effect of a k diverse path parameter for In-
ternet2 physical-level topology. The complete set of plots for evaluating algebraic connec-
tivity improvement for the other physical-level topologies is presented in Appendix B.2.2.
The results of all three networks showed that the cost to achieve a certain TGD decreases
the value of k increases.
87
co
st
 [m
]
TGD
k=12
k=8
k=4
0.0E+0
5.0E+6
1.0E+7
1.5E+7
2.0E+7
2.5E+7
3.0E+7
3.5E+7
0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Figure 5.15: Internet2 cost and TGD
5.3.2 Robustness Evaluation
In this section, we present the set of attacks used to evaluate the flow robustness (cf.
Section 2.2.1) of the resulting improved and non-improved topologies. Then, we apply
these attacks and display the results.
Graph centrality attacks
We use a graph-theoretic model to attack a given graph and show how its flow robustness
changes after each node removal. In this research, we use three centrality metrics: node
betweenness, closeness, and node degree. Thus, we have three attack models, in which
the node with the highest centrality is removed. The node-betweenness attack targets
the node through which the highest number of shortest paths pass. The node-closeness
attack targets the closest node to all the other nodes in terms of hop count. The highest
node degree attack targets the node with the highest number of neighbors. The list of
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removed nodes is determined adaptively for each attack model. This indicates the node
centrality values are calculated after each node is removed and the highest is selected to
be the next node for removal. This is done repeatedly until all nodes are selected. The
adaptive removal of nodes gives a more effective selection for the highest centrality than
the non-adaptive removal, in which the highest targeted number of nodes are selected
based on a single evaluation.
Lowest degree improvement
For comparison purposes, we introduce an intuitive improvement algorithm to improve
the connectivity of a given graph via adding links to the smallest degree nodes. This
algorithm adds one link repeatedly until a number of links requested by the user is added.
On each iteration, one end of the link is connected to the least degree node and the other
end is connected to the next least degree node. If there are multiple least-degree candidate
links, the least-cost link is selected to be added.
Robustness evaluation results
In this section, we show the results of applying graph centrality-based attacks to path
diversity improved (PD-improved), lowest degree improved (LD-improved), and non-
improved topologies. For the set of PD-improved graphs, we choose the set generated
using the hop count threshold h = 15 and the number of diverse path threshold k = 12
because both have yielded the diverse results as shown in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.1. For
each graph, we apply the attack by removing half of its original number of nodes. The
flow robustness is calculated after each node removal. The node-betweenness attack has
the highest negative impact on flow robustness because it targets the most vital nodes in
the Internet2 graph as shown in Figures 5.16 through 5.18. The second highest negative
impact on flow robustness is done by the highest-closeness node attack since the target
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node has the highest-closeness to all the other nodes in terms of hop count. The least
negative impact on flow robustness comes from the highest-degree node since it has a
higher number of neighbors but is not necessarily used by the highest number of shortest
paths.
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Figure 5.16: Robustness of Internet2 against betweenness-based attack
Both PD- and LD-improved graphs are more resilient than non-improved graphs because
they have 20 additional links. For example, the total flow robustness of the PD-improved
Level 3 graph under the betweenness attack is 10.1 while it is 6.5 for the LD-improved
and 5.7 for the non-improved graphs. Among the three provider graph analyses, the PD-
improved graphs are more resilient than the LD- and non-improved graphs for between-
ness and closeness attacks. For degree-based centrality attacks, LD-improved graphs
have higher flow robustness since links are added to the lowest degree nodes, which are
targeted the least as shown in Figure 5.18. Therefore, the links connected to the lowest
degree nodes using LD-improvement contribute more to flow robustness than links added
using PD-improvement during the degree-based attack.
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Figure 5.17: Robustness of Internet2 against closeness-based attack
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Figure 5.18: Robustness of Internet2 against degree-based attack
PD-improved graphs have higher flow robustness in most physical-level graphs because
in PD-improved graphs links are added to increase the number of diverse paths, the most
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among all communicating nodes in the graph. Thus, when a node is removed from a PD-
improved graph, it slightly affects the other communicating nodes since they have more
alternative paths to reroute their communication. In contrast, when a node is removed
from an LD-improved graph, the other communicating nodes are more affected because
they have fewer alternate paths among the communicating nodes. This is because LD-
improvement adds links based on the objective of increasing the connectivity of the lowest
degree node rather than increasing the number of diverse paths.
In this section, we have presented relevant plots to evaluate non- and improved Internet2
physical-level topology. The complete set of plots for evaluating PD-improvement for
the other physical-level topologies is presented in Appendix B.2.3. The other physical-
level topologies showed similar results. For all networks, using the flow robustness graph
metric, the path diversity improved graphs were compared to both lowest degree non-
and improved graphs as they were attacked using node removal based on highest node
centrality graph metrics. The path diversity improved graphs showed better resilience to
these attacks compared to the lowest degree non- and improved graphs. PD-improved
graphs have higher flow robustness in most physical-level graphs because in PD-improved
graphs, links are added to increase the number of diverse paths the most among all
communicating nodes in the graph. Thus, when a node is removed from a PD-improved
graph, it slightly affects the other communicating nodes since they have more alternative
paths to reroute their traffic.
5.4 Improvement via Balancing Centrality
In this section, we apply our improvement algorithm on the Internet2, CORONET,
and Level 3 physical-level topologies presented in Section 3.1.3. Then, we apply three
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centrality-based attacks to the resulting improved and non-improved graphs and show
how the robustness changes during each attack.
5.4.1 Improvement Analysis
In this section, we apply our improvement algorithm on three backbone service-provider
graphs and study the improvement and the cost incurred for each graph as links are
added. The budget constraint for all graphs is 5× 107 meters. The budget is measured
as the sum of the length of the added links.
Betweenness improvement analysis
We apply our algorithm on the three physical graphs while the objective function is
set to minimize betweenness variance. In other words, links are added to uniformly
utilize all nodes in terms of forwarding traffic. The betweenness variance changes while
links are added is shown in Figure 5.19. For all providers, the betweenness variance
starts around 7× 10−3, which is the initial variance. While adding the first 20 links the
variance decreases dramatically to 1×10−3. The first 20 added links contribute greatly to
minimizing the variance, and the remaining links do not have any significant impact on
minimizing the betweenness variance. Therefore, the variance slowly decreases as the rest
of the links are added. The costs incurred as links are added for all providers are shown
in Figure 5.20. The cost is increasing at a similar pace for all providers but their slopes
are different. The cost of adding the first 20 links increases more than after the 20th link
because these links are selected regardless of their high cost since they contribute greatly
to minimizing the betweenness.
Level 3 has the lowest slope, which provides the highest number of added links. This is
because Level 3 has the largest number of nodes, which gives more affordable candidate
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Figure 5.19: Minimizing variance of node betweenness
links to select from. On the other hand, the incurred cost while adding links to Internet2
increases faster than the other two because it has a lower number of links, which in turn
yields a lower number of candidate links. As a result, expensive links are selected, which
consumes the budget more quickly.
Closeness improvement analysis
While selecting the objective function to minimize the variance of the node closeness
of the graph, we apply our algorithm to the three graphs. In other words, links are
added to make the shortest-path distance between all the nodes more uniform. The
variance changes while links are added is shown in Figure 5.21. The variance of closeness
values are different for the three providers. For Level 3 the closeness variance decreases
overall. On the other hand, for Internet2 and CORONET, the variance decreases while
adding the first several links, and then it fluctuates around 5.5×10−4. However, why the
fluctuations happen only for closeness-based improvement is not known and the reasons
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Figure 5.20: Cost of improving node betweenness
for the occurrence of this phenomenon will be the subject of future work. The costs
incurred as links are added for all providers are shown in Figure 5.22. Here, the costs are
similar with no phase changes since the added links do not have a significant contribution
to minimizing closeness variance for Internet2 and CORONET. For Level 3, the cost
exhibits the same increase of the other two providers overall. However, while adding
the 60th link, we observe a small jump in the cost, which corresponds to a significant
decrease in the variance for the same link. This is because the algorithm selects links
that minimize the variance regardless of their cost, which in this case is higher than other
selected links.
Degree improvement analysis
Here, we apply our algorithm to the three physical graphs while the objective function is
set to minimize degree variance in order to have uniform node degree graph. The variance
changes while links are added is shown in Figure 5.23. For all the providers, the degree
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Figure 5.21: Minimizing variance of node closeness
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Figure 5.22: Cost of improving node closeness
variance starts from different initial values but they are not monotonically decreasing, but
rather oscillating. To explain this phenomenon, let us start with uniform node degree
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graphs, where each node has a degree of k, which gives a graph with zero degree variance.
To add links to the graph, the variance has to increase no matter where the links are
placed. The variance increases until it reaches a top point and then it decreases to reach
the zero where the graph has a k+1 node degree. If the number of links needed to increase
k to k + 1 is x, then the top points must be around adding the next x/2 links. Now, we
can observe that the degree variance in Figure 5.23 does not reach zero for any providers.
This is because long links cannot be selected. The costs incurred as links are added for
all providers are shown in Figure 5.24. For all providers, the cost increases overall with
similar pattern of phase changes. For example, Level 3 link addition cost increases at
the same rate. Then, the rate increases until the 27th link is added, which slows the rate
of cost increase. The point where the cost slows down corresponds to the point where
the degree variance is at a minimum. This happens because at this point, the graph has
the maximum number of candidate links to get the next minimum degree variance of the
graph. Hence, the lowest cost link is selected. However, after adding a few links with
the low cost, the remaining links in the candidate set are all expensive. Therefore, the
algorithm has to select one of these links, and the links added before reaching the lowest
variance are more expensive than links selected after passing this point.
Improvement method vs. number of added links
Using the improvement results shown in Figures 5.19, 5.21, and 5.23, we observe that
while limiting the budget to a constant value for all the graphs, the actual number of
added links for a given graph differ based on the used improvement method. For example,
for the Internet2 graph, the numbers of added links using betweenness, closeness, and
degree are: 112, 122, and 112 respectively. For the CORONET graph, the numbers of
added links using betweenness, closeness, and degree are: 154, 174, and 141. For the
Level 3 graph, the numbers of added links using betweenness, closeness, and degree are:
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Figure 5.23: Minimizing variance of node degree
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Figure 5.24: Cost of improving node degree
203, 224, and 171. From these numbers, we observe that closeness improvement methods
always yield the highest number of added links, which implies that they tend to select
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shorter links. On the other hand, both betweenness and degree improvement yield a
fewer number of links. The degree-based improvement method yields the lowest number
of links added with small improvement differences with respect to betweenness-based
method.
5.4.2 Robustness Evaluation
Here, we show the results of applying the graph centrality attacks to non- and improved
graphs while computing the flow robustness of the graph as nodes are removed during
the attack, which causes the removal of 50 nodes from each graph.
The sum of flow robustness values are shown in Table 5.3. By comparing the sum of
flow robustness values of the non- and improved graphs, we can see that the betweenness
attack overall yields lower flow robustness values, which implies that the betweenness
attack is the most destructive attack on these physical graphs. Next, using the same
approach, the closeness attack is second, and the degree attack is the least destructive
attack.
The results of applying three centrality attacks on Internet2 non- and improved graphs
are shown in Figures 5.25, 5.26, and 5.27. For the betweenness attack on Internet2 non-
and improved graphs, we observe that the degree-improved graph has the highest value of
flow robustness of 8.68. Furthermore, the betweenness improved graph comes second in
terms of flow robustness with a very small difference of 8.65. Even though the closeness-
improved graph has the highest number of added links, it yields the lowest flow robustness
among the improvement methods for the Internet2 graph as shown in Table 5.3. For the
closeness attack, the betweenness-improved graph outperforms the other methods with
a flow robustness value of 12.99, while closeness and degree flow robustness values are
10.28 and 8.86. For the degree attack, the degree-improved graph again has the highest
99
Table 5.3: Sum of flow robustness
Provider
Improvement Betweenness Closeness Degree
method attack attack attack
Internet2
non-improved 4.09 5.00 4.71
betweenness 8.65 12.99 15.88
closeness 6.96 10.28 15.48
degree 8.68 8.86 16.95
CORONET
non-improved 7.43 7.84 9.87
betweenness 10.43 12.55 19.72
closeness 8.76 11.66 20.03
degree 10.60 11.79 21.28
Level 3
non-improved 5.68 8.86 16.95
betweenness 11.63 15.36 25.81
closeness 9.56 18.71 21.54
degree 11.08 12.07 25.62
flow robustness of 16.95. The betweenness and closeness improvement methods follow
with flow robustness values of 15.88 and 15.48. By observing all the flow robustness
values for the scenarios we study, the degree improvement is more resilient to attacks
for Internet2, and the closeness improvement is the weakest method for the same graph.
The betweenness improvement method is second but it is closer to the outcome of degree
improvement method.
The results of applying three centrality attacks on CORONET non- and improved graphs
are shown in Figures 5.28, 5.29, and 5.30. While applying the betweenness attack on
CORONET non- and improved graphs, we see that the degree-improved graph has the
highest sum of flow robustness of 10.60. Next, the betweenness-improved graph has a
similar value of flow robustness of 10.43. Similar to the outcome of Internet2, the closeness
has the lowest flow robustness of 8.68. For the closeness attack, the betweenness-improved
graph has the highest flow robustness with a value of 12.55. Next, both degree and
closeness have similar values of 11.79 and 11.66 respectively. For the degree attack, the
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Figure 5.25: Internet2 betweenness-based attack
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Figure 5.26: Internet2 closeness-based attack
degree-improved graph has the highest flow robustness of 21.28. Closeness comes next
with a flow robustness value of 20.03. Finally, the betweenness-improved graph has a flow
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Figure 5.27: Internet2 degree-based attack
robustness value of 19.72. As we can see, similar to Internet2, the degree improvement
is the most resilient among the three methods to centrality attacks for the CORONET
physical graph.
The results of applying three centrality attacks on Level 3 non- and improved graphs
are shown in Figures 5.31, 5.32, 5.33. For the betweenness attack on Level 3 non- and
improved graphs, we observe that the betweenness-improved graph has the highest sum
of flow robustness of 11.63. The degree-improved graph comes second in terms of flow
robustness without much difference of 11.08. Thirdly, the closeness-improved graph has a
flow robustness value of 9.56. For the closeness attack, the closeness-improved graph has
the highest flow robustness value of 18.71. Next, the betweenness-improved graph yields
the second best flow robustness value of 15.36. Last and least is the degree-improved
graph with a flow robustness value of 12.07. For the degree attack, the betweenness-
improved graph has the best flow robustness value of 25.81. With small variation, the
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Figure 5.28: CORONET betweenness-based attack
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Figure 5.29: CORONET closeness-based attack
degree-improved graph comes in second with a value of 25.62. The closeness-improved
graph has the lowest flow robustness value of 21.54. By observing all the flow robustness
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Figure 5.30: CORONET degree-based attack
values for both improvement methods and attacks, we can see that betweenness improve-
ment is more resilient to attacks for Level 3. Then, the degree improvement yields better
results than closeness improvement, which is the weakest method for the Level 3 graph.
Finally, we compare the results of the three improvement methods’ flow robustness values
against the number of added links discussed in Section 5.4.1. We observe that even
though the closeness-based improvement consistently yields the highest number of added
links, it fails to provide better flow robustness values than both betweenness and degree
improvement methods in most attacks. This implies that having a larger number of links
in a given graph does not necessarily guarantee a better resilience. Moreover, adding
links without a careful improvement of networks may not yield any gain in terms of
resilience and performance.
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Figure 5.31: Level 3 betweenness-based attack
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Figure 5.32: Level 3 closeness-based attack
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Figure 5.33: Level 3 degree-based attack
5.5 Spectral Metrics
In this section,we first study the accuracy of each spectra metric in predicting the three
network resilience measures using a non-linear correlation. Then, we calculate and ana-
lyze the spectral robustness metrics for real-world networks. Third, we improve topology
resilience of three real-world physical graphs via adding a set of links to maximize a given
spectral metric.
5.5.1 Spectral Metrics Evaluation
We present our evaluation results for baseline and random graphs. We demonstrate how
each robustness metric is related to the resilience of a given graph against centrality-
based attacks. We use the three resilience graph measures: sums of flow robustness
against degree attack (SFRD), sums of flow robustness against closeness attack (SFRC),
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and sums of flow robustness against betweenness attack (SFRB), which are presented in
Section 3.5.
Table 5.4: Baseline graphs robustness evaluation
Graph Nodes Links λ2 ∆λ τ̂ WS λ̄ SFRD SFRC SFRB
Full-mesh 10 45 10.00 10.00 0.20 1.00 9.66 3.67 3.67 3.67
Torus 9 18 3.00 3.00 0.50 1.27 2.87 3.14 3.14 3.14
Wheel 10 18 1.47 2.63 0.69 1.48 2.95 2.91 2.73 2.73
Grid 9 12 1.00 1.41 0.96 2.44 1.67 2.72 2.61 2.61
Ladder 10 13 0.38 0.73 1.25 3.04 1.61 2.62 2.47 2.47
Ring 10 10 0.38 0.38 1.83 3.75 1.19 2.56 2.29 2.29
Barbell 12 17 0.09 0.01 3.03 3.02 2.19 1.97 1.86 1.86
Linear 10 9 0.10 0.24 3.67 4.37 1.09 2.11 1.67 1.67
Tree 15 14 0.10 0.29 3.50 5.46 1.18 1.61 1.94 1.61
Star 10 9 1.00 3.00 1.80 2.00 1.49 1.00 1.00 1.00
corr(X, SFRD) 0.40 0.24 −0.67 −0.31 0.48
corr(X, SFRC) 0.40 0.24 −0.67 −0.31 0.48
corr(X, SFRB) 0.40 0.24 −0.67 −0.31 0.48
Baseline graphs
We calculate spectral graph robustness metrics for each baseline graph and the results are
shown in Table 5.4. We attempt to have 10 nodes in each graph unless it is structurally
not possible e.g. grid, barbell, and tree graphs. The full-mesh graph is the most robust
since it is fully connected. For this reason, the full-mesh graph has the highest values
for the metrics: λ2, ∆λ, and λ̄. Similarly, against centrality-based attacks, the mesh
graph yields the highest robustness measures: SFRD, SFRC, and SFRB. The full-mesh
graph yields the lowest (most robust) values for the metrics: τ̂ and WS. On the other
hand, the star graph is one of the least robust graphs due to its single-node failure that
causes complete disconnectivity. Against centrality-based attacks, the star graph yields
the lowest value of 1 for all robustness measures because the flow robustness values are all
zero after removing the first node. However, none of the spectral graph metrics capture
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this vulnerability, as shown in Table 5.4. For example, the metrics λ2, ∆λ, τ̂ , and λ̄
values indicate that the 10-node star is more robust than 10-node ladder, which is clearly
not shown by the resilience measures: SFRD, SFRC, and SFRB.
For non-linear comparison, we use Spearman’s rank correlation non-linear coefficient,
which yields 1 for perfect correlation, −1 for perfect inverse non-linear correlation, and
0 for no correlation [106]. We choose to use non-linear correlation because we want to
capture the relation between graph metric values and number of connections is not linear
and our objective is to measure how graph robustness values relate to our three resilience
measurement values: SFRD, SFRC, and SFRB. Between the most resilient baseline (full-
mesh) and the least resilient baseline (star) graph, we show seven other graphs with their
spectral robustness metrics in Table 5.4. To determine the accuracy of each spectral
metric in predicting the graph resilience against the three centrality-based attacks, we use
three Spearman’s rank-based correlation functions: corr(X, SFRD), corr(X, SFRC), and
corr(X, SFRB), which are shown in Table 5.4. For example, the rank correlation value
between λ2 and the robustness measure SFRD is corr(λ2, SFRD)= 0.40. By comparing
all the correlation values, we observe that network criticality τ̂ consistently yields the best
correlation values for the three correlation functions with corr(τ̂ , SFRD)= −0.67, corr(τ̂ ,
SFRC)= −0.67, and corr(τ̂ , SFRB)= −0.67. The minus sign indicates that the relation is
inverse. For the baseline graphs, the second best robustness metric predictor is the natural
connectivity robustness metrics with corr(λ̄, SFRD)= 0.48, corr(λ̄, SFRC)= 0.48, and
corr(λ̄, SFRB)= 0.48. Relatively, the worst robustness metric predictor is the spectral
gap with corr(∆λ, SFRD)= 0.24, corr(∆λ, SFRC)= 0.24, and corr(∆λ, SFRB)= 0.24.
Random graphs
He calculate spectral graph robustness metrics for each random graph. We generate
10, 000 random graphs using 20 nodes for each graph type. We select this sample size
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to achieve high significance level, i.e. p-value ≤ 10−3. We use a non-linear correlation
function to see how each robustness metric is related to flow robustness metric. For each
graph set, we record their spectral graph metrics and then apply the three centrality-
based attacks. Next, we show the correlation rank value between the recorded spectral
robustness values and the resilience measures: SFRD, SFRC, and SFRB. The correlation
results are shown in Table 5.5.
For Gilbert random graphs, we select two alternatives with p = 0.8 and p = 0.5 to gen-
erate dense and semi-dense graphs. We observe that the correlation values are mostly
smaller than other random graph types. This is because Gilbert graphs are completely
random. Moreover, there is no consistency for highest correlation values among robust-
ness metrics to predict network resilience, which tells us that none of the robustness
metrics can be used as robustness measure for Gilbert random graphs.
For Waxman random graphs, we select three combinations of parameters: (α = 0.5, β =
0.5), (α = 0.5, β = 0.8), and (α = 0.5, β = 0.8). For the graphs with α = 0.5 and
β = 0.5, we obtain both medium density graphs and a medium number of long links. For
the graphs with α = 0.5 and β = 0.8, we get medium density graphs and a high number
of long links. For the graphs with α = 0.8 and β = 0.5, we obtain high density graphs
and a medium number of long links. The maximum distance threshold L is set to 1 and
the locations are randomly selected using a uniform distribution with a range of [0, 1] for
both x- and y-axis.
By observing all the correlation values for each Waxman graph combination, we see that
network criticality τ̂ consistently yields the best correlation values for the three correlation
functions. For example, for the resilience against betweenness attack (SFRB), the cor-
relation values are between −0.85 and −0.78, which indicates a high inverse correlation.
This means that most of the time, low network criticality values show high robustness.
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Both algebraic connectivity and weighted spectrum correlation values are good predictors
for network resilience, but they are inconsistent against three centrality-based attacks.
For Gabriel random graphs, network criticality τ̂ also yields consistently the best corre-
lation values against all three centrality-based attacks with correlation values between
−0.77 and −0.66. Without consistency, algebraic connectivity and weighted spectrum
show the second and third best network resilience predictors.
Table 5.5: Random graphs robustness correlation values
Random Graph
SFRD SFRC SFRB
λ2 ∆λ τ̂ WS λ̄ λ2 ∆λ τ̂ WS λ̄ λ2 ∆λ τ̂ WS λ̄
Gilbert p = 0.8 0.47 0.38 -0.47 -0.49 0.41 0.48 0.39 -0.47 -0.49 0.41 0.76 0.37 -0.49 -0.47 0.39
Gilbert p = 0.5 0.53 0.39 -0.62 -0.53 0.47 0.52 0.40 -0.59 -0.50 0.45 0.69 0.34 -0.61 -0.47 0.41
Waxman (α = 0.5, β = 0.5) 0.63 0.43 -0.79 -0.66 0.60 0.65 0.45 -0.78 -0.68 0.60 0.74 0.44 -0.85 -0.72 0.60
Waxman (α = 0.5, β = 0.8) 0.63 0.42 -0.76 -0.60 0.55 0.63 0.45 -0.74 -0.60 0.54 0.74 0.41 -0.81 -0.62 0.52
Waxman (α = 0.8, β = 0.5) 0.61 0.41 -0.73 -0.58 0.52 0.59 0.45 -0.71 -0.58 0.52 0.76 0.39 -0.78 -0.58 0.48
Gabriel 0.53 0.16 -0.66 -0.60 0.57 0.65 0.28 -0.71 -0.57 0.52 0.72 0.27 -0.76 -0.61 0.52
5.5.2 Spectral Metrics Improvement
Here, we improve the spectral robustness of three physical networks by adding a set of
links to maximize a given spectral graph metric. Then, we apply our algorithm to three
physical networks using the five robustness functions while measuring their resilience.
Real-World Networks Improvement
In this section, we apply our algorithm presented in 4.4.1 to improve three real-world
networks. The objective functions are set to either: maximize algebraic connectivity λ2,
minimize network criticality τ̂ , maximize natural connectivity λ̄, maximize spectral gap
∆λ, or minimize weighted spectrum WS. In this research, we set the number of required
links Li to 30 for all input graphs.
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For the three graphs, we apply the three centrality-based attacks on non- and improved
graphs to evaluate the spectral robustness improved graph resilience against such attacks.
While removing each node, we examine the flow robustness values. For Level 3, the
results of applying betweenness-based, closeness-based, degree-based attacks are shown
in Figure 5.34, Figure 5.35, and Figure 5.36. Moreover, we present sums of flow robustness
during each attack and the spectral robustness values of non- and improved graph are
shown in Table 5.6.
We observe that all improved graphs yield better results than non-improved graphs given
that improved graphs have 30 additional links. Among the improved graphs, we see that
τ̂ -improved, i.e. network criticality improved, perform better than the other spectral
metrics improved graphs. Among all nine scenarios, seven scenarios show τ̂ -improved
graphs have the highest resilience measures: SFRD, SFRC, and SFRB. The second best
performing spectral robustness metric is algebraic connectivity, which shows the second
highest resilience measures in the same seven scenarios. Moreover, λ2-improved graphs
have the highest resilience measures in the two remaining scenarios. The other spectral
robustness metrics do not show consistent network resilience results. For example, the
weighted spectrum improving approach yields mostly the worst resilience for CORONET
graphs; however, the weighted spectrum improving approach yields the third best re-
silience values for the Level 3 graph. This inconsistency can be also seen for the other
two metrics: spectral gap and natural connectivity. In this section, we have presented
relevant plots to evaluate improved Level 3 and CORONET physical networks. The
complete set of plots for evaluating other physical-level topologies is presented in Ap-
pendix B.3.
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Figure 5.34: Level 3 betweenness-based attack
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Figure 5.35: Level 3 closeness-based attack
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Figure 5.36: Level 3 degree-based attack
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Figure 5.37: CORONET closeness-based attack
5.6 Comprehensive Evaluation of Metrics Accuracy
In this section, we compare the accuracy of several graph properties and graph robust-
ness metrics to predict network resilience against targeted attacks. Using a set of baseline113
Table 5.6: Real-world networks robustness evaluation
Graph Nodes Links λ2 ∆λ τ̂ WS λ̄ SFRD SFRC SFRB
non-improved-CORONET 75 99 0.04 0.27 2.52 18.11 1.59 9.87 9.87 7.41
λ2-improved-CORONET 75 129 0.17 1.19 1.32 12.33 2.43 12.91 12.91 9.33
τ̂ -improved-CORONET 75 129 0.14 0.48 1.09 11.18 2.02 14.23 14.23 9.36
λ̄-improved-CORONET 75 129 0.04 3.99 2.22 15.61 5.09 12.53 12.53 6.76
∆λ-improved-CORONET 75 129 0.04 4.98 2.27 15.94 5.39 11.97 11.97 7.50
WS-improved-CORONET 75 129 0.08 0.14 1.33 9.85 2.24 10.44 10.44 7.03
non-improved-Internet2 57 65 0.04 0.16 3.40 16.84 1.36 4.71 4.71 4.05
λ2-improved-Internet2 57 95 0.17 0.65 1.33 9.82 2.14 11.82 11.82 7.71
τ̂ -improved-Internet2 57 95 0.16 0.46 1.12 8.68 1.96 10.43 10.43 8.20
λ̄-improved-Internet2 57 95 0.04 5.77 3.03 14.50 6.06 7.26 7.26 3.97
∆λ-improved-Internet2 57 95 0.04 5.14 2.87 14.14 5.37 6.76 6.76 4.05
WS-improved-Internet2 57 95 0.08 0.13 1.49 7.47 2.27 5.78 5.78 4.46
non-improved-Level 3 99 132 0.03 0.15 3.24 23.80 1.71 7.30 7.30 5.68
λ2-improved-Level 3 99 162 0.15 0.56 1.43 16.70 2.15 13.62 13.62 9.55
τ̂ -improved-Level 3 99 162 0.12 0.35 1.23 15.77 2.02 16.72 16.72 11.24
λ̄-improved-Level 3 99 162 0.03 5.39 2.97 22.00 5.94 9.71 9.71 5.71
∆λ-improved-Level 3 99 162 0.03 5.40 2.74 22.13 5.73 9.53 9.53 5.68
WS-improved-Level 3 99 162 0.05 0.32 1.54 14.33 2.11 10.12 10.12 7.47
graphs, we calculate graph properties and robustness metrics for each graph to give an in-
tuition for how each metric is determined. We use three resilience graph measures: sums
of flow robustness against degree attack (SFRD), sums of flow robustness against close-
ness attack (SFRC), and sums of flow robustness against betweenness attack (SFRB),
which are presented in Section 3.5.
5.6.1 Baseline Graphs
In this section, we generate 10 nodes in each graph presented in Section 3.1.1 unless it
is structurally impossible, e.g. grid, torus, barbell, and tree graphs, in which case we
generate the feasible network closest to 10 nodes. Then, we apply the graph metrics
presented in Section 2.2 and calculate their values for each generated baseline graph.
Moreover, we measure the resilience of each graph against node attacks using the three
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measures SFRD, SFRC, and SFRB, shown in Table 5.7. For each metric, we measure
its accuracy in predicting the resilience of the graphs by correlation of its values with
resilience measures. For example, the accuracy of the metric number of links |L| in
predicting the resilience measure SFRD is 0.74. By observing all the correlation values:
corr(X, SFRD), corr(X, SFRC), and corr(X, SFRB), we notice that the total graph
diversity TGD graph metric has the highest accuracy values of 0.99, 0.96, 0.96 for corr(X,
SFRD), corr(X, SFRC), and corr(X, SFRB). Next, we observe that node average degree
comes second with 0.91, 0.88, and 0.84 for the resilience measures. The third highest
is variance of node-betweenness metric with accuracy values corr(σ2CBv , SFRD | SFRC |
SFRB) ≤ −0.85. Here the negative sign denotes an inverse correlation with robustness.
Among the presented graphs, the full-mesh graph has obviously the highest resilient
since there is a link between every pair. On the other hand, the star graph has the lowest
resilience because removing one node can fully disconnect the network. We observe that
just only TGD and average node degree graph metric captures this fact by ranking the
full-mesh as the highest and the star as the lowest. Although algebraic connectivity and
network criticality do not rank the mesh and star graphs correctly, their over all accuracy
in predicting the resilience is higher, corr( λ2, SFRD | SFRC | SFRB) ≥ 0.71 and corr(τ̂ ,
SFRD | SFRC | SFRB) ≤ −0.84, than the rest (except TGD and average node degree).
5.6.2 Random Graphs
In the baseline graphs evaluation, we have studied and compared 10 structurally different
graphs to give some intuition about robustness metrics. However, with just 10 graphs,
we can not draw a solid conclusion about the accuracy of the compared metrics to predict
their resilience against node attacks. In this section, we increase our graph sample size
from 10 graphs to 30,000 graphs divided into six 5000-sample-size classes. We select
this sample size to achieve high significance level, i.e. p-value ≤ 10−4. We note that all
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Table 5.7: Evaluating graph robustness metrics using baseline graphs
Star Tree Linear Barbell Ring Ladder Grid Wheel Torus Mesh corr(X,SFRD) corr(X,SFRC) corr(X,SFRB)
|N| 10.00 15.00 10.00 12.00 10.00 10.00 9.00 10.00 9.00 10.00 — — —
|L| 9.00 14.00 9.00 17.00 10.00 13.00 12.00 18.00 18.00 45.00 0.68 0.79 0.74
C̄D 1.80 1.87 1.80 2.83 2.00 2.60 2.67 3.60 4.00 9.00 0.84 0.88 0.91
σ2CD
5.76 0.92 0.16 0.47 0.00 0.24 0.44 3.24 0.00 0.00 -0.58 -0.48 -0.55
σ2CC
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.43 -0.40 -0.44
σ2CBv
0.09 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.88 -0.85 -0.85
σ2CBl
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.56 -0.54 -0.54
CC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.33 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.66
As -1.00 -0.52 -0.12 0.13 1.00 0.28 -0.06 -0.33 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.61 0.68
R 1.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 -0.38 -0.46 -0.40
D 2.00 6.00 9.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 -0.60 -0.65 -0.62
d̄ 1.80 3.50 3.67 3.48 2.78 2.33 2.00 1.60 1.50 1.00 -0.71 -0.73 -0.73
TGD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.39 0.68 0.73 0.82 0.91 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.99
λ2 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.38 0.38 1.00 1.47 3.00 10.00 0.81 0.78 0.78
∆λ 3.00 0.29 0.24 0.01 0.38 0.73 1.41 2.63 3.00 10.00 0.58 0.60 0.57
τ̂ 1.80 3.50 3.67 3.03 1.83 1.25 0.96 0.69 0.50 0.20 -0.84 -0.87 -0.87
WS 2.00 5.46 4.37 3.02 3.75 3.04 2.44 1.48 1.27 1.00 -0.67 -0.65 -0.71
λ̄ 1.49 1.18 1.09 2.19 1.19 1.61 1.67 2.95 2.87 9.66 0.75 0.77 0.82
C∗ 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.44 1.00 0.87 0.84 0.88
SFRD 1.00 1.61 2.11 1.97 2.56 2.62 2.72 2.91 3.14 3.67 1.00 0.95 0.99
SFRC 1.00 1.94 1.67 1.86 2.29 2.47 2.61 2.73 3.14 3.67 0.95 1.00 0.96
SFRB 1.00 1.61 1.67 1.86 2.29 2.47 2.61 2.73 3.14 3.67 0.99 0.96 1.00
SFR 1.00 1.72 1.82 1.90 2.38 2.52 2.64 2.79 3.14 3.67 0.99 0.96 1.00
randomly generated graphs are all connected to avoid zero values for spectral robustness
metrics. The number of nodes in each generated graph is 20. Using three corr(X, SFRD),
corr(X, SFRC), and corr(X, SFRB), we calculate the accuracy of each graph metric to
predict resilience using a sample of 5000 graphs. The correlation results are shown in
Table 5.8.
Gilbert graphs evaluation
In Table 5.8, the first two graph types are Gilbert random graphs with p = 0.8 and
p = 0.5. The Gilbert random graphs are random graphs that do not model real-world
communication networks. By observing the correlation values of the all metrics for the
three attacks, we see that all graph metrics have a low accuracy in predicating network
resilience i.e. corr(X, SFRD | SFRC | SFRB) are mostly lower than 0.70 because of
the randomness in generating Gilbert graphs. However, among the graph metrics, the
116
Table 5.8: Evaluating graph robustness metrics using random graphs
|L| C̄D σ2CD σ
2
CC
σ2CBn
σ2CBl
CC As R D d̄ij TGD λ2 ∆λ τ̂ WS λ̄ C
∗
corr(X, SFRD)
Gilbert p=0.8 0.44 0.44 -0.43 -0.33 -0.53 -0.47 0.36 0.38 0.21 0.00 -0.42 0.53 0.47 0.39 -0.45 -0.47 0.41 0.47
Gilbert p=0.5 0.54 0.54 -0.38 -0.27 -0.66 -0.53 0.31 0.40 0.00 -0.04 -0.54 0.47 0.53 0.39 -0.61 -0.52 0.47 0.61
W(0.5, 0.5) 0.75 0.75 -0.06 -0.35 -0.81 -0.69 0.25 0.30 -0.12 -0.33 -0.70 0.74 0.63 0.43 -0.79 -0.66 0.61 0.79
W(0.5, 0.8) 0.68 0.68 -0.24 -0.49 -0.78 -0.68 0.23 0.35 0.13 -0.24 -0.67 0.67 0.64 0.42 -0.76 -0.60 0.55 0.76
W(0.8, 0.5) 0.63 0.63 -0.25 -0.47 -0.75 -0.64 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.15 -0.64 0.60 0.61 0.39 -0.73 -0.57 0.51 0.73
Gabriel 0.65 0.65 0.12 -0.01 -0.49 -0.50 0.26 0.14 -0.12 -0.31 -0.55 0.70 0.53 0.15 -0.66 -0.60 0.56 0.66
corr(X, SFRC)
Gilbert p=0.8 0.45 0.45 -0.44 -0.33 -0.54 -0.47 0.37 0.39 0.21 0.00 -0.42 0.54 0.49 0.40 -0.45 -0.47 0.42 0.48
Gilbert p=0.5 0.52 0.52 -0.35 -0.25 -0.64 -0.52 0.27 0.37 0.00 -0.04 -0.52 0.44 0.51 0.40 -0.58 -0.50 0.45 0.58
W(0.5, 0.5) 0.73 0.73 -0.02 -0.35 -0.83 -0.73 0.20 0.20 -0.12 -0.33 -0.71 0.72 0.64 0.46 -0.78 -0.67 0.60 0.78
W(0.5, 0.8) 0.68 0.68 -0.20 -0.50 -0.78 -0.71 0.18 0.26 0.13 -0.24 -0.68 0.67 0.65 0.46 -0.76 -0.61 0.55 0.76
W(0.8, 0.5) 0.63 0.63 -0.20 -0.45 -0.75 -0.66 0.20 0.27 0.43 0.16 -0.64 0.58 0.60 0.44 -0.71 -0.57 0.51 0.71
Gabriel 0.61 0.61 0.17 0.02 -0.58 -0.65 0.17 0.12 -0.15 -0.36 -0.62 0.71 0.65 0.27 -0.71 -0.58 0.52 0.71
corr(X, SFRB)
Gilbert p=0.8 0.43 0.43 -0.60 -0.41 -0.61 -0.69 0.32 0.25 0.15 0.00 -0.43 0.59 0.75 0.37 -0.49 -0.46 0.39 0.49
Gilbert p=0.5 0.49 0.49 -0.43 -0.29 -0.62 -0.64 0.23 0.28 0.00 -0.09 -0.50 0.42 0.69 0.33 -0.60 -0.46 0.40 0.60
W(0.5, 0.5) 0.76 0.76 -0.03 -0.40 -0.84 -0.81 0.22 0.15 -0.16 -0.41 -0.77 0.81 0.74 0.45 -0.85 -0.72 0.60 0.85
W(0.5, 0.8) 0.67 0.67 -0.24 -0.56 -0.78 -0.79 0.18 0.20 0.11 -0.31 -0.71 0.74 0.75 0.42 -0.81 -0.62 0.52 0.81
W(0.8, 0.5) 0.62 0.62 -0.26 -0.54 -0.73 -0.78 0.19 0.16 0.42 0.11 -0.68 0.66 0.76 0.39 -0.78 -0.58 0.48 0.78
Gabriel 0.62 0.62 0.18 0.06 -0.53 -0.68 0.17 0.10 -0.22 -0.43 -0.69 0.73 0.73 0.27 -0.77 -0.61 0.51 0.77
σ2CBv metric has slightly higher accuracy than the other metrics for degree and closeness
attacks. Moreover, we observe that the algebraic connectivity λ2 has the highest accu-
racy, corr(λ2, SFRB)≥ 0.66, in predicting graph resilience against betweenness attack
(SFRB). On the other hand, we notice that both radius and diameter graph properties
have consistently the lowest accuracy in predicting network resilience for the two Gilbert
graphs.
Waxman graphs evaluation
The next three random graphs are generated using Waxman models, W(α, β) , with three
combination of parameters: (α = 0.5, β = 0.5), (α = 0.5, β = 0.8), and (α = 0.5, β =
0.8). Waxman graphs exhibit mesh-like properties that can model logical-level networks
with some long links to reduce diameter. For the graphs with α = 0.5 and β = 0.5, we get
obtain medium density graphs and medium number of long links. For the graphs with
α = 0.5 and β = 0.8, we get medium density graphs and a high number of long links.
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For the graphs with α = 0.8 and β = 0.5, we get high density graphs and a medium
number of long links. The maximum distance threshold L is set to 1 and the locations
are randomly selected using a uniform distribution with a range of [0, 1] for both x-axis
and y-axis.
Unlike Gilbert graphs results, some Waxman graph metrics have high accuracy values
in measuring resilience. We observe that the variance of node-betweenness metric has
a slightly higher accuracy than the other metrics for degree and closeness attacks, i.e.
corr(σ2CBn , SFRD | SFRC) ≤ −0.75. Next, both network criticality τ̂ and effective graph
resistance C∗ are the second best predictors for graph resilience against both degree
and closeness attacks. In fact, both metrics have almost identical accuracy results be-
cause they both claim to measure graph resistance using the eigenvalues of the Laplacian
matrix.
For the betweenness attack, both network criticality τ̂ and effective graph resistance C∗
are the best predictor for graph resilience with corr(τ̂ , SFRB)≤ −0.78. We also note that
both σ2CBl
and TGD metrics have the second- and third-best results for the betweenness
attack. Moreover, we observe that the radius graph property generally performs very
poorly in predicting the graph resilience.
Gabriel graphs evaluation
The sixth random graph class is generated using Gabriel graphs that exhibit mesh-like
structure and model physical-level networks. By observing the correlation values of the
all metrics for the three attacks, we see that the total graph diversity TGD has the
best accuracy values for predicting network resilience against both degree and closeness
attacks with corr(TGD, SFRD | SFRC)≥ 0.70. For the betweenness attack, we see that
both τ̂ and C∗ are the best predictors for graph resilience.
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5.7 Comprehensive Evaluation of Improved Graphs
In this section, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of improved graph resilience of
both un- and weighted graphs. We start applying our algorithm presented in Section 4.4.1
to improve the three real-world graphs presented in Section 3.1.3.
5.7.1 Unweighted Real-World Improved Graphs
We apply our algorithm presented in Section 4.4.1 to three unweighted physical graphs:
CORONET, Internet2, and Level 3, which are discussed in Section 3.1.3. Then we apply
three centrality-based attacks while measuring network resilience against such attacks.
Table 5.9 shows a summary our evaluation of each improved graph of the three physical
networks.
For Level 3, the results of applying betweenness-, closeness-, and degree-based attacks
are shown in Figure 5.38, Figure 5.39, and Figure 5.40 respectively. The Level 3-σ2CBl
-
improved graph indicates consistent best results against the three centrality-based attacks
with 14.62, 13.75, and 10.37 for the degree-based, closeness-based, and betweenness-
based attacks. Hence, adding links to the Level 3 physical network to increase link-
betweenness yields the best outcome in terms of network resilience against centrality-
based attacks. Next, the Level 3-σ2CBn -improved graph also shows consistent second best
network resilience results. On the other hand, Level 3-CC-improved graphs show the
worst results among all the other graph robustness improvement approaches with 7.80,
7.68, and 5.70 for the degree-, closeness-, and betweenness-based attacks. In this section,
we have presented relevant plots to evaluate improved Level 3. The complete set of plots
for evaluating other physical-level topologies is presented in Appendix B.4.
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Figure 5.38: Level 3 betweenness attack
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Figure 5.39: Level 3 closeness attack
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Figure 5.40: Level 3 degree attack
5.7.2 Evaluation of Improved Weighted Graphs
Here, we apply our algorithm presented in Section 4.4.1 to weighted graphs.
Weighted graphs via population-based model
For our dataset, we start with applying our population-based weighted graph model,
which is discussed in Section 3.1.6, to convert three unweighted physical graphs: CORO-
NET, Internet2, and Level 3. We note that we convert the resulting weights to loga-
rithmic scale to avoid any overflow while computing graph robustness metrics. Then,
we apply our algorithm presented in Section 4.4.1 to the weight graphs to generate im-
proved graphs based on improving graph robustness metrics. To evaluate the improved
graphs, we compute their weighted flow robustness while applying the three centrality
attacks presented in Section 3.4. A summary of wighted flow robustness values is shown
in Table 5.10.
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For CORONET, the results of applying betweenness-, closeness-, and degree-based at-
tacks are shown in Figure 5.41, Figure 5.42, and Figure 5.43. The CORONET-d̄ij-
improved graph shows consistent best results against the three centrality-based attacks
with sums of weighted flow robustness: 10430.15, 6514.62, 6024.30 for the degree-,
closeness-, and betweenness-based attacks respectively. We observe that the assorta-
tivity improved graph for CORONET has the second highest sum of weight flow ro-
bustness for degree-based attack with 9381.73. However, assortativity improved graph
is not consistent for other attacks. We also observe the CORONET-WS-improved con-
sistently has the lowest sum weighted flow robustness values against centrality-based
attacks. In fact, weighted spectrum improved graphs have the worst network resilient
against centrality attacks as shown in Table 5.10. Here, we have presented relevant
plots to evaluate improved CORONET. The complete set of plots for evaluating other
physical-level topologies is presented in Appendix B.5. For Internet2, we observe that
the Internet2-d̄ij-improved graph yields the highest resilience against centrality-based at-
tacks with 7044.33, 5327.80, and 3559.27 for degree-, closeness-, and betweenness-based
attacks. This indicates adding links to minimize the avaerge shortest path length, has
the best network resilience outcome for CORONET and Internet2. However, for Level
3, minimizing the average shortest path length yields the second-best resilience against
centrality-based attacks while adding links to balance node degree shows the best out-
come.
Real-world weighted graphs
In this section, we apply our algorithm, presented in Section 4.4.1, to three real-world
networks: GÉANT, CARNet, and InternetMCI, which are discussed in Section 3.1.4. To
evaluate the improved graphs, we compute their weighted flow robustness while apply-
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Figure 5.41: CORONET betweenness attack
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Figure 5.42: CORONET closeness attack
ing the three centrality attacks presented in Section 3.4. A summary of weighted flow
robustness sum values is presented in Table 5.11.
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Figure 5.43: CORONET degree attack
For the GÉANT network, the results of applying betweenness-, closeness-, and degree-
based attacks are shown in Figure 5.44, Figure 5.45, and Figure 5.46. The GÉANT-σ2CD-
improved graph shows the best weighted flow robustness sums with 3595.01, 3651.72,
and 3407.27 for the degree-based, closeness-based, and betweenness-based attacks re-
spectively. This indicates that adding links to balance node degree increases the network
resilience against centrality-based attacks for GÉANT network. On the other hand,
GÉANT-λ̄-improved graph has the lowest weighted flow robustness sums with 1990.79,
1996.02, and 1815.88 for the degree-, closeness-, and betweenness-based attacks. This
indicates that the natural connectivity improved graph has the worst network resilience
outcome against centrality-based attacks. Here, we have presented relevant plots to
evaluate improved GÉANT. The complete set of plots for evaluating other real-world
physical-level topologies is presented in Appendix B.6. By studying the robustness values
presented in Table 5.11, we observe that adding links to balance node-degree yields the
best network resilience against centrality-based attacks for all studied networks: GÉANT,
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CARNet, and InternetMCI.
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Figure 5.44: GÉANT betweenness attack
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Figure 5.45: GÉANT closeness attack
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Table 5.9: Evaluating robustness improvements for unweighted graphs
Physical Network Degree-based Closeness-based Betweenness-based
CORONET-λ2-improved 11.60 9.30 8.36
CORONET-As-improved 12.09 7.99 7.14
CORONET-CC-improved 10.02 7.80 6.56
CORONET-∆λ-improved 11.40 8.32 7.50
CORONET-d̄ij-improved 13.56 8.76 7.91
CORONET-τ̂ -improved 13.07 10.28 8.20
CORONET-λ̄-improved 11.67 8.01 7.52
CORONET-σ2CC-improved 12.31 9.22 7.67
CORONET-σ2CD-improved 14.40 8.20 7.58
CORONET-σ2CBl
-improved 11.60 11.13 8.66
CORONET-σ2CBn -improved 13.55 11.55 8.57
CORONET-WS-improved 9.68 7.47 7.06
CORONET-TGD-improved 13.41 11.55 8.55
Internet2-λ2-improved 8.90 7.26 7.29
Internet2-As-improved 9.09 5.78 5.26
Internet2-CC-improved 5.01 5.06 4.54
Internet2-∆λ-improved 7.37 5.56 4.03
Internet2-d̄ij-improved 7.83 6.31 4.28
Internet2-τ̂ -improved 8.40 7.16 6.64
Internet2-λ̄-improved 5.54 5.18 4.16
Internet2-σ2CC-improved 7.16 6.03 5.66
Internet2-σ2CD-improved 10.83 6.11 5.70
Internet2-σ2CBl
-improved 8.98 7.21 6.58
Internet2-σ2CBn -improved 9.77 9.30 6.63
Internet2-WS-improved 4.67 5.69 4.75
Internet2-TGD-improved 10.12 7.33 5.92
Level 3-λ2-improved 10.50 8.79 8.18
Level 3-As-improved 9.46 10.47 6.41
Level 3-CC-improved 7.80 7.68 5.70
Level 3-∆λ-improved 8.44 6.87 6.34
Level 3-d̄ij-improved 8.50 7.32 5.76
Level 3-τ̂ -improved 12.35 11.93 9.32
Level 3-λ̄-improved 9.73 7.36 5.68
Level 3-σ2CC-improved 12.72 11.07 8.28
Level 3-σ2CD-improved 10.77 8.99 7.97
Level 3-σ2CBl
-improved 14.62 13.75 10.37
Level 3-σ2CBn -improved 13.28 13.38 9.79
Level 3-WS-improved 9.89 8.90 7.28
Level 3-TGD-improved 9.21 9.22 7.56
126
Table 5.10: Evaluating robustness improvements for population-based weighted graphs
Physical Network Degree-based Closeness-based Betweenness-based
CORONET-λ2-improved 4712.15 4376.82 3899.71
CORONET-As-improved 9381.73 5791.27 5281.90
CORONET-CC-improved 4388.05 4353.74 4285.38
CORONET-∆λ-improved 6102.39 6326.00 5054.87
CORONET-d̄ij-improved 10430.15 6514.62 6024.30
CORONET-τ̂ -improved 5146.35 4148.58 4206.44
CORONET-λ̄-improved 5864.78 5299.41 4356.62
CORONET-σ2CC-improved 7457.33 5193.96 4674.90
CORONET-σ2CD-improved 9094.29 6109.17 5230.00
CORONET-σ2CBl
-improved 5786.06 4956.59 4212.64
CORONET-σ2CBn -improved 6406.11 5423.42 4737.15
CORONET-WS-improved 3586.61 3374.56 3062.07
Internet2-λ2-improved 3844.34 3231.05 2974.61
Internet2-As-improved 6225.39 4104.42 3773.49
Internet2-CC-improved 2334.44 2731.45 2380.37
Internet2-∆λ-improved 4736.14 4757.46 3639.58
Internet2-d̄ij-improved 7044.33 5327.80 3559.27
Internet2-τ̂ -improved 3099.54 2667.66 2561.42
Internet2-λ̄-improved 4149.55 3207.58 3343.96
Internet2-σ2CC-improved 4816.39 3916.03 3662.18
Internet2-σ2CD-improved 4835.10 3992.52 3272.50
Internet2-σ2CBl
-improved 3926.28 3747.95 3079.85
Internet2-σ2CBn -improved 4699.29 4081.54 3599.80
Internet2-WS-improved 2017.65 2384.85 1790.56
Level 3-λ2-improved 5896.48 5122.69 4867.06
Level 3-As-improved 7394.54 8623.41 4827.91
Level 3-CC-improved 5192.12 5261.19 4023.00
Level 3-∆λ-improved 6719.40 6167.78 4540.16
Level 3-d̄ij-improved 8386.53 7174.46 5574.43
Level 3-τ̂ -improved 6124.60 5623.22 5384.33
Level 3-λ̄-improved 6797.31 6705.19 5120.55
Level 3-σ2CC-improved 8232.40 7104.23 5486.29
Level 3-σ2CD-improved 9444.25 7830.35 5656.45
Level 3-σ2CBl
-improved 5727.69 5234.82 5073.34
Level 3-σ2CBn -improved 6220.91 6225.07 5762.63
Level 3-WS-improved 3563.84 3478.68 3180.70
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Table 5.11: Evaluating robustness improvements for real-world weighted graphs
Graph Degree-based Closeness-based Betweenness-based
GÉANT-λ2-improved 2689.34 3254.40 2645.45
GÉANT-TGD-improved 3430.82 3547.47 3293.76
GÉANT-σ2CC-improved 3485.94 3582.98 3316.64
GÉANT-CC-improved 2109.32 2467.93 1959.08
GÉANT-WS-improved 2088.80 2053.28 2036.48
GÉANT-d̄ij-improved 2840.92 2650.70 2420.92
GÉANT-σ2CBn -improved 2475.68 3074.53 2416.86
GÉANT-τ̂ -improved 3112.70 3487.71 3037.95
GÉANT-σ2CBl
-improved 2454.03 2662.36 2633.43
GÉANT-∆λ-improved 2035.75 2123.06 1971.23
GÉANT-As-improved 3025.59 2957.06 2299.24
GÉANT-σ2CD-improved 3595.01 3651.72 3407.27
GÉANT-λ̄-improved 1990.79 1996.02 1815.88
CARNet-λ2-improved 785.55 783.64 783.86
CARNet-TGD-improved 884.20 885.12 882.91
CARNet-σ2CC-improved 761.88 814.33 761.42
CARNet-CC-improved 535.88 535.88 535.88
CARNet-WS-improved 592.08 592.08 592.08
CARNet-d̄ij-improved 559.37 559.37 559.10
CARNet-σ2CBn -improved 683.13 806.41 683.13
CARNet-τ̂ -improved 609.27 609.27 609.27
CARNet-σ2CBl
-improved 638.77 671.50 632.91
CARNet-∆λ-improved 591.21 591.21 591.21
CARNet-As-improved 591.07 595.89 590.46
CARNet-σ2CD-improved 971.71 945.40 913.42
CARNet-λ̄-improved 610.69 610.69 610.69
InternetMCI-λ2-improved 1331.28 1448.18 1344.51
InternetMCI-TGD-improved 1537.10 1589.06 1503.54
InternetMCI-σ2CC-improved 1647.56 1777.40 1590.09
InternetMCI-CC-improved 1008.40 932.71 969.92
InternetMCI-WS-improved 999.50 1169.75 1005.81
InternetMCI-d̄ij-improved 1504.41 1465.11 1196.64
InternetMCI-σ2CBn -improved 1441.09 1526.83 1503.74
InternetMCI-τ̂ -improved 1464.10 1434.94 1429.81
InternetMCI-σ2CBl
-improved 1230.81 1204.31 1211.90
InternetMCI-∆λ-improved 1191.46 1101.51 1107.31
InternetMCI-As-improved 1768.10 1647.31 1426.78
InternetMCI-σ2CD-improved 1731.64 1656.70 1514.42
InternetMCI-λ̄-improved 1180.94 1136.56 1107.23
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Figure 5.46: GÉANT closeness attack
5.8 Resilience State-Space Model Evaluation
We apply the resilience space-state model evaluation [7, 9, 87] on three networks: Level
3, Internet2, and CORONET, which are presented in Section 3.1.3. The resilience state
model is discussed in Section 2.3. We define our operational state s as the ratio of
operational nodes to the total number of nodes in the graph. On the other hand, we
define our service model to be the end-to-end connectivity p between node pairs, which
is the flow robustness of a given graph. For evaluation, we apply three centrality-based
attacks presented in Section 3.4 to the improved graphs for each real-world network,
presented in Section 5.7.2. The applied challenge is set to remove the 15% of the total
number of nodes since after 15%, the network connectivity reaches the lowest point in
the studied networks. Thus, we define our operational state as follows. Under normal
conditions, the normal state is defined as 95% of nodes are operational. As challenges
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impact the network, the partially degraded is defined to have 90%–95% operational nodes.
As the network is severely impacted, the severely degraded is defined as the number is
operational nodes is below 90%.
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Figure 5.47: Resilience state space for Level 3 with degree attack
For Level 3 improved graphs, the results of applying degree-, closeness-, and betweenness-
based attacks are shown in Figure 5.47, Figure 5.48, and Figure 5.49. Generally, the
results match our improvement evaluation, discussed in Section 5.7.1, which shows the
results of applying centrality-based attack to remove all nodes while in this evaluation, we
only the remove 15% of the total number of graph. For the degree- and closeness-based
attacks, we observe that the Level 3-σ2CBl
-improved graph stays in acceptable service state
for normal and partially degraded states. Then, it starts to move to the impaired state
as the network enters the severely degraded state. For betweenness-based attack, the
attack impact is more sever than degree- and closeness-based attacks since none of the
networks provide an acceptable service with partially degraded operation. However, we
still observe that the the Level 3-σ2CBl
-improved graph outperform other improved graphs.
130
E
2E
 c
on
ne
ct
iv
ity
operational nodes
normal partially degraded severely degraded
0.95 ≤ n = 1.00 0.90 ≤ n < 0.95 0.85 ≤ n < 0.90
acceptable
impaired
unacceptable
p ≥ 0.67
0.34 ≤ p < 0.67
p < 0.34
λ
2
As
CC
∆λ
−
d
τ
−λ
TGD
σ2
C
C
σ2
C
D
σ2
C
Bl
σ2
C
Bn
WS
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Figure 5.48: Resilience state space for Level 3 with closeness attack
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Figure 5.49: Resilience state space for Level 3 with betweenness attack
Hence, adding links to Level 3 network to balance link-betweenness has the best network
resilience against centrality-based attacks.
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Figure 5.50: Resilience state space for Internet2 with degree attack
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Figure 5.51: Resilience state space for Internet2 with closeness attack
For Internet2 improved graphs, the results of applying degree-, closeness-, and betweenness-
based attacks are shown in Figure 5.50, Figure 5.51, and Figure 5.52. For the degree-
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Figure 5.52: Resilience state space for Internet2 with betweenness attack
based attacks, we observe that several improved graphs such as Internet2-λ2-improved,
Internet2-σ2CBl
-improved, and Internet2-τ̂ -improved graphs stay in acceptable service state
for normal and partially degraded states. However, only the Internet2-σ2CBl
-improved
graph keeps the same good behavior for closeness-based attack. For the betweenness-
based attack, we observe that the Internet2-λ2-improved graph outperforms the other
improved graphs. These results indicate that for Internet2, both adding links to max-
imize algebraic connectivity or balance link-betweenness yeild the best results against
centrality-based attacks.
For CORONET improved graphs, the results of applying degree-, closeness-, and betweenness-
based attacks are shown in Figure 5.53, Figure 5.54, and Figure 5.55. For the degree-based
attacks, we observe that most of the improved graphs stay in acceptable service state for
normal and partially degraded states, except for CORONET-As-improved, CORONET-
CC-improved, and CORONET-WS-improved graphs. This indicates that adding links
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Figure 5.53: Resilience state space for CORONET with degree attack
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Figure 5.54: Resilience state space for CORONET with closeness attack
to maximize cluster coëficcient, for example, does not improve network resilience against
centrality-based attacks. We observe that the CORONET-σ2CBl
-improved graph con-
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Figure 5.55: Resilience state space for CORONET with betweenness attack
sistently yields the best network resilience against such attacks. Thus, adding links to
balance link-betweenness produces the highest network resilience against centrality-based
attacks.
By studying the results for all networks presented in Table 5.12, we observe that there
is no ideal graph robustness metric to be the objective function for adding new links.
However, adding links to balance link-betweenness shows the highest accuracy among all
studied robustness functions in providing the best network resilience against centrality-
based attacks.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter, we started by presenting our evaluation of three improvement algorithms:
algebraic connectivity, path diversity, and balancing centrality. Then, we presented two
comparison evaluations: spectral metric comparison and comprehensive improvement.
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For algebraic connectivity improvement, we applied our algorithm, described in Sec-
tion 4.1.1, to physical-level topologies of the several backbone providers. The results
showed trade-offs between improving algebraic connectivity and minimizing cost, from
which a cost-efficient set of link addition can be chosen based on the value of γ. More-
over, we applied centrality-based attacks on the non- and improved graphs and study
their resilience in terms of flow robustness. We showed that graphs with higher algebraic
connectivities have mostly higher flow robustness values, which means that they are more
resilient
For path diversity improvement, we applied our algorithm to three service provider
physical-level topologies. Using the flow robustness graph metric, the path diversity
improved graphs were compared to both lowest degree non- and improved graphs as they
were attacked using node removal based on highest node centrality graph metrics. The
path diversity improved graphs show better resilience to these attacks compared to the
lowest degree non- and improved graphs.
For balancing centrality improvement, we evaluated our algorithm that minimizes the
node centrality variance of a given graph based on three centrality functions: node
betweenness, closeness, and node degree. Then, we applied this algorithm using each
function on three physical graphs and study the variance minimization and cost incurred
while adding the links. We studied the resilience of the non- and improved graphs us-
ing the centrality attacks via the same centrality functions. For each attack, we study
the flow robustness of each non- and improved graph. Overall, the results showed the
degree-improved graphs outperform the other two improvement methods for these phys-
ical graphs. Then, with a similar outcome, the betweenness comes in second, and the
weakest improvement method is closeness minimization.
For spectral graph metrics evaluation and improvement, we evaluated a set of graph
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spectra robustness metrics: algebraic connectivity, spectral gap, natural connectivity,
weighted spectrum, and network criticality. Among these robustness metrics, we showed
that network criticality is the best metric to measure baseline, Waxman and Gabriel ran-
dom graphs resilience against centrality-based attacks. For Gilbert random graphs, we
showed that none of the compared metrics can predicate graph robustness with consis-
tency. Moreover, we showed that network criticality yields the best results in improving
a given real-world physical graph by adding a specific number of links via a greedy al-
gorithm. Similarly, the algebraic connectivity improved graphs yielded the second best
results in terms of resilience against centrality-based attacks.
For our comprehensive comparison evaluation, we evaluated a set of graph robustness
metrics to measure their accuracy in predicting network resilience against centrality-
based attacks via baseline and random graphs. For baseline graphs, we showed that the
path diversity metric has a high accuracy in predicting network resilience. Generally, the
variance of node-betweenness centrality has the highest accuracy. For Waxman graphs,
which resemble logical-level networks, the variance of node-betweenness centrality metric
has the highest accuracy for degree- and closeness-based attacks while network criticality
τ̂ and effective graph resistance C∗ have better results for betweenness-based attack. All
path diversity, network criticality, and effective graph resistance have a high accuracy in
measure network resilience centrality-based attacks for Gabriel graphs, which resemble
physical-level networks.
For our comprehensive improvement comparison evaluation, we applied our improve-
ment algorithm with each presented graph metric as an objective function. Using three
datasets, we showed how each improved graph behaves against centrality-based attacks.
Our results indicate that network criticality, link betweenness, and node betweenness-
balanced graphs are generally more resilient to centrality-based attacks.
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Table 5.12: Resilience values via state model evaluation
Graph Degree-based Closeness-based Betweenness-based
Level 3-λ2-improved 9.51 7.94 7.40
Level 3-As-improved 8.66 9.48 5.81
Level 3-CC-improved 6.95 6.92 5.19
Level 3-∆λ-improved 7.73 6.21 5.84
Level 3-d̄ij-improved 7.42 6.58 5.17
Level 3-τ̂ -improved 10.46 10.02 8.28
Level 3-λ̄-improved 8.92 6.72 5.17
Level 3-σ2CC-improved 10.44 9.77 7.32
Level 3-σ2CD-improved 8.72 7.75 7.12
Level 3-σ2CBl
-improved 11.96 11.45 9.27
Level 3-σ2CBn -improved 10.38 11.43 8.52
Level 3-WS-improved 8.93 8.10 6.54
Level 3-TGD-improved 8.08 8.28 6.78
CORONET-λ2-improved 9.37 8.16 7.39
CORONET-As-improved 9.19 6.58 6.04
CORONET-CC-improved 9.03 6.88 5.84
CORONET-∆λ-improved 9.31 7.11 6.71
CORONET-d̄ij-improved 9.57 7.04 6.96
CORONET-τ̂ -improved 9.55 8.30 6.85
CORONET-λ̄-improved 9.52 7.09 6.72
CORONET-σ2CC-improved 9.41 7.36 6.53
CORONET-σ2CD-improved 9.36 6.59 6.26
CORONET-σ2CBl
-improved 9.55 8.77 7.35
CORONET-σ2CBn -improved 9.52 8.82 6.93
CORONET-WS-improved 8.30 6.43 6.31
CORONET-TGD-improved 9.50 9.21 7.07
Internet2-λ2-improved 6.80 5.83 6.07
Internet2-As-improved 6.93 4.64 4.36
Internet2-CC-improved 4.43 4.48 4.08
Internet2-∆λ-improved 6.16 4.54 3.46
Internet2-d̄ij-improved 6.47 5.21 3.66
Internet2-τ̂ -improved 6.58 5.32 5.26
Internet2-λ̄-improved 4.68 4.34 3.63
Internet2-σ2CC-improved 5.73 4.71 4.58
Internet2-σ2CD-improved 7.05 4.81 4.55
Internet2-σ2CBl
-improved 7.05 5.78 5.31
Internet2-σ2CBn -improved 7.05 7.05 5.29
Internet2-WS-improved 4.10 5.04 4.26
Internet2-TGD-improved 6.85 5.39 4.69
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation presents models to un- and weighted graphs for communication net-
works. Using these models, we study the network resilience against network random
failures and targeted attacks. In addition, we investigate several graph robustness met-
rics presented in the literature and evaluate their accuracy to measure network resilience
against such attacks. Furthermore, we design several greedy algorithms to improve a
given graph resilience via adding a set of links. Finally, using a dataset of real-world and
synthetic graphs, we the resilient of the improved graphs of our dataset and compare
their robustness against centrality-based attacks.
6.1 Conclusions
In Chapter 3, we presented our dataset, which includes baseline, random, and real-
world graphs. Then, we introduced our graph robustness metrics and how they capture
balanced-centrality of a given graph. We presented our weighted flow robustness and
showed how it is used to capture network resilience. We also introduced several centrality-
based attack models and how they are used to measure network resilience. In addition,
we discussed how our model converts unweighted graphs to weighted graphs using node
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populations and link betweenness. Finally, we presented how we use flow robustness to
measure network resilience against centrality attacks.
In Chapter 4, we presented four improvement algorithms to improve network resilience
against targeted attacks. First, the algebraic-connectivity improvement algorithm was
presented to add links to improve maximize algebraic connectivity, which improves the
resilience against graph partitioning. Next, the path diversity-improvement algorithm
was presented to improve network path diversity in terms of increasing the number of
disjoint paths. Third, the balancing-centrality-improvement algorithm was introduced to
add links to balance a given graph centrality such as degree, closeness, and betweenness.
Finally, the comprehensive comparison algorithm was presented to add links to a given
graph via a specified robustness function.
In Chapter 5, we presented several evaluation improvement algorithms: algebraic connec-
tivity, path diversity, balancing centrality, spectral-metric comparison, and comprehen-
sive improvement. We showed trade-offs between improving algebraic connectivity and
minimizing cost, from which a cost-efficient set of link additions can be chosen based on
the value of γ. For path diversity improvement, our results showed that the path diversity
improved graphs have better resilience to these attacks compared to the lowest degree
non- and improved graphs. For balancing centrality improvement, the results show the
degree-improved graphs outperform the other two improvement methods for these phys-
ical graphs. Then, with a similar outcome, the betweenness comes in second, and the
weakest improvement method is closeness minimization. For spectral graph metrics eval-
uation and improvement, we evaluate a set of graph spectra robustness metrics: algebraic
connectivity, spectral gap, natural connectivity, weighted spectrum, and network critical-
ity. Among these robustness metrics, we show that network criticality is the best metric
to measure baseline, Waxman and Gabriel random graphs resilience against centrality-
based attacks. For Gilbert random graphs, we show that there is none of the compared
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metrics can predicate graph robustness with consistency. Moreover, we demonstrate that
network criticality yields the best results in improving a given real-world physical graph
by adding a specific number of links via a greedy algorithm. Similarly, the algebraic
connectivity improved graphs yield the second-best results in terms of resilience against
centrality-based attacks.
For our comprehensive comparison evaluation, we studied a set of graph robustness met-
rics to measure their accuracy in predicting network resilience against centrality-based
attacks via baseline and random graphs. For baseline graphs, we showed that the path
diversity metric has a high accuracy in predicting network resilience. Generally, the
variance of node-betweenness centrality has the highest accuracy to measure network re-
silience. For Waxman graphs, which resemble logical-level networks, the variance of node-
betweenness centrality metric has the highest accuracy for degree- and closeness-based
attacks while network criticality τ̂ and effective graph resistance C∗ have better results
for the betweenness-based attack. All path diversity, network criticality, and effective
graph resistance have high accuracy in measuring network resilience against centrality-
based attacks for Gabriel graphs, which resemble physical-level networks. For our studies
of comprehensive improvement comparison, we applied our improvement algorithm with
each presented graph metric as an objective function. Using three datasets, we showed
how each improved graph behaves against centrality-based attacks. Our results indicated
that network design based on network criticality, link betweenness and node betweenness
balanced graphs are generally more resilient to centrality-based attacks.
For the resilience state model evaluation, we applied on three networks: Level 3, Inter-
net2, and CORONET. The resilience state model is discussed in Section 2.3. By studying
the results for all networks, we observe that there is no ideal graph robustness metric
to be the objective function for adding new links. However, adding links to balance
link-betweenness shows the highest consistency among all studied robustness functions
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in providing the best network resilience against centrality-based attacks.
6.2 Future Work
In this research, we focused on physical level networks. For our future work, we plan to
study the improvement of logical level networks and other overlay networks. The cost of
adding physical layer links is dominated by the link length. However, the cost in logical
level networks is related to the number of ports. Multilevel evaluation and improvement
can be more efficient for overall network performance. However, combining logical and
physical network levels in our improvement algorithms can lead to more sophisticated
research problems. In this research, we consider node locations for new link cost. We plan
to investigate new methods to improve graph diversity by balancing the node locations
to avoid correlated geographic failures. Moreover, adding new nodes is a similar problem,
which requires further investigation.
Here, we focused on evaluating a given network by applying centrality-based attacks. In
the future, we plan to investigate other challenges such as correlated geographic failures
and random failures. Our measure for network resilience is the sum of flow robustness as
nodes are attacked, which is a graph theoretic model. We plan to evaluate and compare
improved graphs using the ns-3 [111] network simulator to study other performance
parameters such as packet delivery and end-to-end delay in a more realistic environment.
142
Bibliography
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Appendix A
Dataset Maps
This appendix contains a full set maps for our dataset presented in Section 3.1.
A.1 Unweighted Maps
Figure A.1: AT&T map
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Figure A.2: Sprint map
Figure A.3: Level 3 map
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Figure A.4: Internet2 map
Figure A.5: CORONET map
159
A.2 Weighted Maps
Figure A.6: GÉANT map
160
Figure A.7: CARNet map
Figure A.8: InternetMCI map
161
Figure A.9: KAREN map
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Appendix B
Graph Improvement Plots
This appendix contains a full set of plots for the topologies used in the analysis of the
graph improvement algorithms.
B.1 Graph Improvement via Algebraic Connectivity
B.1.1 Algebraic Connectivity Improvement
163
al
ge
br
ai
c 
co
nn
ec
tiv
ity
number of links added
γ=0.00
γ=1E-9
γ=1E-7
γ=1E-5
γ=1.00
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure B.1: AT&T connectivity improvement
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Figure B.2: AT&T cost incurred with adding links
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Figure B.3: Connectivity and cost trade-offs for AT&T
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Figure B.4: Level 3 connectivity improvement
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Figure B.5: Level 3 cost incurred with adding links
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Figure B.6: Connectivity and cost trade-offs for Level 3
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Figure B.7: Sprint connectivity improvement
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Figure B.8: Sprint cost incurred with adding links
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Figure B.9: Connectivity and cost trade-offs for Sprint
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Figure B.10: Internet2 connectivity improvement
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Figure B.11: Internet2 cost incurred with adding links
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Figure B.12: Connectivity and cost trade-offs for Internet2
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Figure B.13: CORONET connectivity improvement
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Figure B.14: CORONET cost incurred with adding links
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Figure B.15: Connectivity and cost trade-offs for CORONET
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B.1.2 Flow Robustness Evaluation of Algebraic Connectivity
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Figure B.16: AT&T betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.17: AT&T closeness-based attack
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Figure B.18: AT&T degree-based attack
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Figure B.19: Level 3 betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.20: Level 3 closeness-based attack
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Figure B.21: Level 3 degree-based attack
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Figure B.22: Sprint betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.23: Sprint closeness-based attack
flo
w
 r
ob
us
tn
es
s
number of nodes removed
a(G)-improved:γ=0
a(G)-improved:γ=1E-7
a(G)-improved:γ=1
non-improved
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
0 10 20 30 40 50
Figure B.24: Sprint degree-based attack
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Figure B.25: Internet2 betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.26: Internet2 closeness-based attack
177
flo
w
 r
ob
us
tn
es
s
number of nodes removed
betweenness-improved
closeness-improved
degree-improved
non-improved
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Figure B.27: Internet2 degree-based attack
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Figure B.28: CORONET betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.29: CORONET closeness-based attack
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Figure B.30: CORONET degree-based attack
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B.2 Graph Improvement via Path Diversity
B.2.1 Impact of Varying Hop Count Threshold on TGD and
Cost
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Figure B.31: CORONET TGD improvement
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Figure B.32: CORONET cost incurred
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Figure B.33: CORONET cost and TGD
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Figure B.34: Internet2 TGD improvement
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Figure B.35: Internet2 cost incurred
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Figure B.36: Internet2 cost and TGD
T
G
D
number of links added
h=15
h=10
h=5
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0 5 10 15 20
Figure B.37: Level 3 TGD improvement
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Figure B.38: Level 3 cost incurred
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Figure B.39: Level 3 cost and TGD
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B.2.2 Impact of Varying k on TGD and Cost
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Figure B.40: CORONET TGD improvement
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Figure B.41: CORONET cost incurred
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Figure B.42: CORONET cost and TGD
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Figure B.43: Internet2 TGD improvement
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Figure B.44: Internet2 cost incurred
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Figure B.45: Internet2 cost and TGD
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Figure B.46: Level 3 TGD improvement
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Figure B.47: Level 3 cost incurred
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Figure B.48: Level 3 cost and TGD
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B.2.3 Flow Robustness Evaluation of PD-improved Graphs
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Figure B.49: CORONET betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.50: CORONET closeness-based attack
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Figure B.51: CORONET degree-based attack
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Figure B.52: Internet2 betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.53: Internet2 closeness-based attack
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Figure B.54: Internet2 degree-based attack
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Figure B.55: Level 3 betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.56: Level 3 closeness-based attack
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Figure B.57: Level 3 degree-based attack
194
fl
o
w
 r
o
b
u
s
tn
e
s
s
number of nodes removed
∧
τ-improved-Level 3
λ
2
-improved-Level 3
−
λ-improved-Level 3
∆λ-improved-Level 3
WS-improved-Level 3
non-improved-Level 3
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Figure B.58: Level 3 betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.59: Level 3 closeness-based attack
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Figure B.60: Level 3 degree-based attack
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Figure B.61: Internet2 betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.62: Internet2 closeness-based attack
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Figure B.63: Internet2 degree-based attack
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B.3 Spectral Graph Robustness Improvement
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Figure B.64: CORONET betweenness-based attack
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Figure B.65: CORONET closeness-based attack
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Figure B.66: CORONET degree-based attack
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B.4 Unweighted Graphs Improvement Evaluation
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Figure B.67: Internet2 betweenness attack
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Figure B.68: Internet2 closeness attack
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Figure B.69: Internet2 degree attack
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Figure B.70: CORONET betweenness attack
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Figure B.71: CORONET closeness attack
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Figure B.72: CORONET-WP-L1 degree attack
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Figure B.73: Level 3 betweenness attack
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Figure B.74: Level 3 closeness attack
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Figure B.75: Level 3 degree attack
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B.5 Weighted Graphs Improvement Evaluation
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Figure B.76: CORONET betweenness attack
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Figure B.77: CORONET closeness attack
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Figure B.78: CORONET degree attack
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Figure B.79: Internet2 betweenness attack
206
flo
w
 r
ob
us
tn
es
s
number of nodes removed
λ
2
-improved
As-improved
CC-improved
∆λ-improved
-
d-improved
∧τ-improved
−λ-improved
σ2CC-improvedσ2CD-improvedσ2CBl-improvedσ2CBn-improved
WS-improved
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0 5 10 15 20
Figure B.80: Internet2 closeness attack
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Figure B.81: Internet2 degree attack
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Figure B.82: Level 3 betweenness attack
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Figure B.83: Level 3 closeness attack
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Figure B.84: Level 3 degree attack
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B.6 Real-World Weighted Graphs Improvement Eval-
uation
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Figure B.85: GÉANT betweenness attack
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Figure B.86: GÉANT closeness attack
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Figure B.87: GÉANT closeness attack
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Figure B.88: CARNet betweenness attack
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Figure B.89: CARNet closeness attack
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Figure B.90: CARNet closeness attack
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Figure B.91: InternetMCI betweenness attack
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Figure B.92: InternetMCI closeness attack
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Figure B.93: InternetMCI closeness attack
216
